An evolutionary model with Turing machines

The development of a large non-coding fraction in eukaryotic DNA and the phenomenon of the code-bloat in the field of evolutionary computations show a striking similarity. This seems to suggest that (in the presence of mechanisms of code growth) the evolution of a complex code can't be attained without maintaining a large inactive fraction. To test this hypothesis we performed computer simulations of an evolutionary toy model for Turing machines, studying the relations among fitness and coding/non-coding ratio while varying mutation and code growth rates. The results suggest that, in our model, having a large reservoir of non-coding states constitutes a great (long term) evolutionary advantage.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figure

Ants don't have friends: thoughts on socially intelligent agents

The question what is an agent? has been under dis cussion for many years. However, a consensus exists that the term 'agent' only makes sense in a multi-agent context - namely if there are at least two agents and assuming interaction and or communication between the agents. Agent research is generally done fairly independently in dfferent research areas, separated by the nature of the agents - natural or articial. This paper presents some thoughts on agency and sociality. Social intelligence is studied in the context of human style forms of social behaviour. Issues like embodiment, believability, rationality, social understanding,and different levels of social organisation and control are discussed

Darwinism, probability and complexity : market-based organizational transformation and change explained through the theories of evolution

The study of transformation and change is one of the most important areas of social science research. This paper synthesizes and critically reviews the emerging traditions in the study of change dynamics. Three mainstream theories of evolution are introduced to explain change: the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest, the Probability model and the Complexity approach. The literature review provides a basis for development of research questions that search for a more comprehensive understanding of organizational change. The paper concludes by arguing for the development of a complementary research tradition, which combines an evolutionary and organizational analysis of transformation and change

Unweaving the Program: Bernard Stiegler and the Hegemony of Technology

Fil: Vaccari, Andrés P. Universidad Nacional de Río Negro. Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Sobre Territorios, Economía y Sociedad. Río Negro; ArgentinaStiegler’s approach is twofold. Firstly, his repetition of the history of metaphysics aims to uncover technics as the suppressed, foundational supplement: the originary prostheticity of thought. For example, Stiegler locates in Rousseau’s and Leroi-Gourhan’s accounts of the appearance of the human a suppression of technics; a forgotten origin that must be veiled over by a second origin: a miraculous birth of the human proper (as intellectual substance or symbolic consciousness). Stiegler, on the contrary, argues that technics is the decisive event in the historical genesis of the human; in fact, both the human and technicity proper appear at the same moment. Secondly, Stiegler inhabits the work of certain figures (in particular Simondon, Husserl and Leroi-Gourhan) from whom he adopts and adapts some key conceptual tools, such as tendency, individuation, tertiary retention, exteriorisation and program. There is a less successful attempt to engage with a range of scientific and technological developments; in particular genetics and biotechnology, which will be discussed here shortly. The application of technics as a theoretical framework, in a traditional sense, is not entirely commensurable with the deconstructive side ofStiegler’s project. On one hand Stiegler uses technics to think beyond the aporia at the heart of philosophy, the limit of thought at the origin of the great fault-lines of western thought. At times Stiegler’s argument veers towards a kind of reductionism and essentialism about technics. One of the targets of this paper is this tendency to shrink the history of technology into a logical trajectory that thinks technics in terms of writing and related metaphors. This logic rests on a series of ontological ruptures, in particular a radical division between the living and the nonliving. As we shall see, these issues are interwoven with a number of other problems. In particular, I focus in Stiegler’s mobilisation of informatic models applied to processes of enculturation, the barrier between the living and the nonliving, and to figure the technical contamination of the living. The notion of “program”, a central tool of Stiegler’s project, will be given special attention. There is also some tension arising from Stiegler’s attempt to combine distinct approaches (such as Leroi-Gourhan’s, Simondon’s and Derrida’s) that find their genesis in quite different philosophical concerns and fields of application. I will conclude by advancing an alternative myth to that of Prometheus: the Sumerian story of Inanna and the transmission of technics into civilisation. This myth suggests another way of approaching the question of technics, with perhaps a more interesting or liberating conclusion: there is no technics, no technology above and beyond pure differentiation.El enfoque de Stiegler es doble. En primer lugar, su repetición de la historia de la metafísica tiene como objetivo descubrir las técnicas como el suplemento fundamental suprimido: la prótesis original del pensamiento. Por ejemplo, Stiegler localiza en los relatos de Rousseau y Leroi-Gourhan sobre la apariencia del ser humano una supresión de las técnicas; un origen olvidado que debe ser velado por un segundo origen: un nacimiento milagroso del propio ser humano (como sustancia intelectual o conciencia simbólica). Stiegler, por el contrario, argumenta que la técnica es el evento decisivo en la génesis histórica del ser humano; de hecho, tanto el ser humano como la tecnicidad propiamente dicha aparecen en el mismo momento. En segundo lugar, Stiegler habita el trabajo de ciertas figuras (en particular Simondon, Husserl y Leroi-Gourhan) de quienes adopta y adapta algunas herramientas conceptuales clave, como la tendencia, la individualización, la retención terciaria, la exteriorización y el programa. Hay un intento menos exitoso de comprometerse con una gama de desarrollos científicos y tecnológicos; en particular la genética y la biotecnología, que se discutirán aquí en breve. La aplicación de la técnica como marco teórico, en un sentido tradicional, no es del todo comparable con el lado deconstructivo del proyecto de Stiegler. Por un lado, Stiegler utiliza técnicas para pensar más allá de la aporía en el corazón de la filosofía, el límite del pensamiento en el origen de las grandes fallas del pensamiento occidental. A veces, el argumento de Stiegler se desvía hacia una especie de reduccionismo y esencialismo sobre las técnicas. Uno de los objetivos de este trabajo es esta tendencia a reducir la historia de la tecnología a una trayectoria lógica que piense en las técnicas en términos de escritura y metáforas relacionadas. Esta lógica se basa en una serie de rupturas ontológicas, en particular una división radical entre los vivos y los no vivos. Como veremos, estos problemas están entrelazados con otros problemas. En particular, me centro en la movilización de Stiegler de modelos informáticos aplicados a procesos de enculturación, la barrera entre los vivos y los no vivos, y para calcular la contaminación técnica de los vivos. Se prestará especial atención a la noción de "programa", una herramienta central del proyecto de Stiegler. También existe cierta tensión derivada del intento de Stiegler de combinar enfoques distintos (como los de Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon y Derrida) que encuentran su génesis en preocupaciones filosóficas y campos de aplicación bastante diferentes. Concluiré avanzando un mito alternativo al de Prometeo: la historia sumeria de Inanna y la transmisión de técnicas a la civilización. Este mito sugiere otra forma de abordar la cuestión de las técnicas, con quizás una conclusión más interesante o liberadora: no hay técnicas, no hay tecnología más allá de la pura diferenciación