1,473 research outputs found
Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting
In an exchange economy with a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents maymake mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistake-free) process consist of (i) all core allocations as absorbing states, and (ii) non-singleton classes of non-core allocations. Next, we introduce a perturbed process, where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes -do not improve- in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, we show that the unique stochastically stable state of the perturbed process is the Walrasian allocation. In economies with indifferences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while some core allocations are not. The robustness of these results is confirmed in a weak coalitional recontracting process
Stochastic Coalitional Better-response Dynamics and Strong Nash Equilibrium
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic
game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a
joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile
all players from the coalition are strictly benefited. Such deviations define a
coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics that is in general stochastic. The
CBR dynamics either converges to a strong Nash equilibrium or stucks in a
closed cycle. We also assume that at each time a selected coalition makes
mistake in deviation with small probability that add mutations (perturbations)
into CBR dynamics. We prove that all strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles
are stochastically stable, i.e., they are selected by perturbed CBR dynamics as
mutations vanish. Similar statement holds for strict strong Nash equilibrium.
We apply CBR dynamics to the network formation games and we prove that all
strongly stable networks and closed cycles are stochastically stable
Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a
team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation
models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply
different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to
our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where
agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability,
where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find
that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise
stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize
the overall number of activities performed by teams.Comment: 44 page
Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting.
In an exchange economy with a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents maymake mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistake-free) process consist of (i) all core allocations as absorbing states, and (ii) non-singleton classes of non-core allocations. Next, we introduce a perturbed process, where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes -do not improve- in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, we show that the unique stochastically stable state of the perturbed process is the Walrasian allocation. In economies with indifferences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while some core allocations are not. The robustness of these results is confirmed in a weak coalitional recontracting process.
MISTAKES IN COOPERATION: THE STOCHASTIC STABILITY OF EDGEWORTH'S RECONTRACTING
In an exchange economy with a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents maymake mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistake-free) process consist of (i) all core allocations as absorbing states, and (ii) non-singleton classes of non-core allocations. Next, we introduce a perturbed process, where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes –do not improve– in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, we show that the unique stochastically stable state of the perturbed process is the Walrasian allocation. In economies with indifferences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while some core allocations are not. The robustness of these results is confirmed in a weak coalitional recontracting process.
MIMO-OFDM Based Energy Harvesting Cooperative Communications Using Coalitional Game Algorithm
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.In this paper, we consider the problem of cooperative communication between relays and base station in an advanced MIMO-OFDM framework, under the assumption that the relays are supplied by electric power drawn from energy harvesting (EH) sources. In particular, we focus on the relay selection, with the goal to guarantee the required performance in terms of capacity. In order to maximize the data throughput under the EH constraint, we model the transmission scheme as a non-transferable coalition formation game, with characteristic function based on an approximated capacity expression. Then, we introduce a powerful mathematical tool inherent to coalitional game theory, namely: the Shapley value (Sv) to provide a reliable solution concept to the game. The selected relays will form a virtual dynamically-configuredMIMO network that is able to transmit data to destination using efficient space-time coding techniques. Numerical results, obtained by simulating the EH-powered cooperativeMIMO-OFDMtransmission with Algebraic Space-Time Coding (ASTC), prove that the proposed coalitional game-based relay selection allows to achieve performance very close to that obtained by the same system operated by guaranteed power supply. The proposed methodology is finally compared with some recent related state-of-the-art techniques showing clear advantages in terms of link performance and goodput.Peer reviewe
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