Coordination of Decentralized Supply Chains: A Literature Review

Due to the fact that the double margin exists in the decentralized supply chain, many papers focus on the coordination of decentralized supply chain. In this paper, we classify these papers into three parts according to the structure of supply chain. The first kind of supply chain consists of one upstream supplier and one downstream retailer. The second one consists of multiple suppliers and a single retailer. The last one refers to the supply chain with multiple suppliers and a single retailer. This paper can enable readers to get the knowledge of existing research on supply chain coordination. We also give some interesting future research concerning this topic

Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions In Retail Supply Chains With Customer Value

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value‐added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non‐cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers

공급업체간 경쟁이 수익공유 계약에 미치는 영향

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경영학과, 2015. 2. 박상욱.공급사슬의 영역이 넓어지고 세분화 됨에 따라 개별 기업의 성과보다는 공급사슬 전체의 관점에서 최적의 성과를 내는 것이 점점 중요한 문제가 되고 있다. 그에 따라 공급사슬 구성원 간에 적절한 인센티브를 제공하는 계약을 통해 전체 최적의 성과를 낼 수 있도록 의사 결정 조정을 유도하는 방법에 대한 연구가 공급사슬 관리 분야에서 중요한 주제로 자리잡았으며, 수익공유 계약은 그 대표적인 사례이다. 이 연구는 공급자가 주도하는 시장에서 하나의 판매업체와 두 개의 공급업체로 이루어진 공급사슬을 대상으로 하나의 업체가 수익공유 계약을 도입할 때의 공급사슬 성과에 관해 알아보았다. 경쟁 상황과 구성원의 합리적 의사 결정을 반영하기 위해 게임이론을 사용하였으며 구성원 간의 협력 정도에 따라 수익공유 계약을 두 가지로 나누어 도매가 계약과의 성과를 비교하였다. 결과로, 수익공유 계약을 도입하기 위해서는 계약 당사자간의 협력과 의사 소통이 반드시 필요하며 하나의 공급업체만 계약을 사용하여도 모든 업체의 성과가 더 높아질 수 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한 계약의 효과는 가격 민감성과 제품간 대체성의 정도에 따라 달라지며 상황에 따라 계약을 사용할 수 없는 경우도 존재한다. 이 결과는 기업들이 실제로 수입공유 계약을 도입하려 할 때 어떠한 점을 우선적으로 고려해야 하는지에 대한 시사점을 제공해 준다는 데에서 의미를 가질 수 있을 것이다.1. 서론 1 2. 문헌연구 4 3. 모델 8 3.1. 도매가 계약 모델 10 3.2 수익공유 계약 모델 12 3.2.1. 배타적 의사결정에 의한 수익공유 계약 15 3.2.2. 협력적 의사결정에 의한 수익공유 계약 17 4. 결과 분석 19 4.1 배타적 수익공유 계약의 성과 20 4.2 협력적 수익공유 계약의 성과 22 4.2.1. 수익공유 계약을 사용할 수 있는 조건 23 4.2.2 공급업체 간의 이윤 비교 28 5. 결론 32 참고문헌 35 부록 41 Abstract 43Maste

Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain

Coordination of Supply Chain with a Dominant Retailer under Demand Disruptions

We develop a coordination model of a one-manufacturer multi-retailers supply chain with a dominant retailer. We consider the impact of a dominant retailer on the market retail price and his sales promotion opportunity and examine how the manufacturer can coordinate such a supply chain by revenue-sharing contract after demand disruptions. We address the following important research questions in this paper. (i) How do we design an appropriate revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain with a dominant retailer without demand disruptions? (ii) When demand is disrupted with variations in market scale and price sensitive coefficient, can the original contract still be valid? (iii) How do the demand disruptions affect the coordination mechanism under different disruption scenarios and how should the new contract change? Finally, we generate important insights by both analytical and numerical examples

Coordinating Three-Level Supply Chain by Revenue-Sharing Contract with Sales Effort Dependent Demand

Revenue-sharing contract is a kind of mechanism to improve performance or to achieve perfect coordination of supply chain. Considering a three-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer who faces a stochastic and sales effort dependent demand, the paper analyzes the impact of sales effort on supply chain coordination and expounds the reasons why traditional revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain in this condition. Given three cases: only the retailer bears the sales effort cost, only the manufacturer bears the sales effort cost, and the retailer bears the sales effort cost with the manufacturer, the paper proposes an improved revenue-sharing contract based on quantity discount policy to coordinate the supply chain. It illustrates that improved revenue sharing contract can coordinate supply chain by implementing it in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized, respectively, by addition form and multiplication form with sales effort dependent demand. Formulas are given to determine the optimal contract parameters. Finally, numerical experiments are given to test the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract

AN INVENTORY CONTROL POLICY WITH TRACKING INFORMATION FOR DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAINS

Recently, many products have been sold through retail stores and direct sales via the Internet. For dual-channel supply chains, Chiang and Monahan (2010) and Chiang (2010) have proposed an inventory control policy; however, they assumed one-for-one replenishment and short replenishment lead times. For single-channel supply chains with long and uncertain replenishment lead times, Liu et al. (2009) have introduced tracking information into inventory control. However, they did not consider the cost of tracking information. Therefore, in this paper, a Markov chain model for dual-channel supply chains with long and uncertain replenishment lead times is developed, and an inventory control policy is proposed that considers tracking information and its cost. The performance of the proposed policy is evaluated and compared with two policies, one without tracking information and the other without reduplicated normal replenishment. The results show the effectiveness of the proposed policy

Strategic Capacity Planning Problems in Revenue‐Sharing Joint Ventures

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154244/1/poms13128_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154244/2/poms13128.pd

Optimal strategies of automakers with demand and credit price disruptions under the dual-credit policy

In this paper, a production and pricing decision model for automakers under the dual-credit policy is formulated. Then, with consideration of demand and credit price disruptions, a nonlinear programming model that maximizes automakers’ profit and constrains the production of fuel vehicles (FVs) and new energy vehicles (NEVs) is investigated. Furthermore, four strategies that involve adjusting the production or price of FVs and NEVs are proposed, and four optimal solutions for each strategy are obtained. Finally, 16 scenarios are comprehensively analyzed, and a case study involving demand and credit price disruptions is conducted. The results show that the dual-credit policy has a positive impact on the development of NEVs, especially in early stages of NEV development. The FV credit coefficient has a significantly positive impact on the probability of automakers adopting adjustment strategies, while the NEV credit coefficient has almost no such impact. Moreover, automakers are inclined to adjust the prices of NEVs or the production of FVs to cope with demand and credit price disruptions