71,828 research outputs found
Extending Introspection
Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook is a case of introspection the same way that knowing my non-extended beliefs is. Traditionally this sort of introspection is thought to be privileged and special in ways that the extended introspection case seems not to be. There is nothing privileged about looking at my notebook. Anyone could do it. The aim of the paper is to find out how to understand extended introspection and whether there is something privileged and special about knowing one’s own extended beliefs. Moreover, the notebook case has close analogs using twenty-first century technology. It seems possible to know our beliefs that are extended to smartphones, wearable technology or a cloud-based data store. First, I present the case of extended introspection. I then discuss whether it should be understood as ordinary introspection or as mind-reading. Both seem to be bad fits, which finally prompts an original account for extended introspection based on epistemic rules
Methodological Artefacts in Consciousness Science
Consciousness is scientifically challenging to study because of its subjective aspect. This leads researchers to rely on report-based experimental paradigms in order to discover neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). I argue that the reliance on reports has biased the search for NCCs, thus creating what I call 'methodological artefacts'. This paper has three main goals: first, describe the measurement problem in consciousness science and argue that this problem led to the emergence of methodological artefacts. Second, provide a critical assessment of the NCCs put forward by the global neuronal workspace theory. Third, provide the means of dissociating genuine NCCs from methodological artefacts
Is Vision for Action Unconscious?
Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is thus wrongly assumed that introspective reports speak to absent phenomenology in the dorsal stream. In light of this, I consider a different conception of consciousness’s relation to agency in terms of access. While theoretical reasons suggest that the inaccessibility of the dorsal stream to conceptual report is evidence that it is unconscious, this position begs important questions. I propose a broader notion of access in respect of the guidance of intentional agency and not, narrowly, conceptual report (Note: this paper contradicts my earlier paper, "The Case for Zombie Agency")
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Automatically bridging the semantic gap in machine introspection
Disclosed are various embodiments that facilitate automatically bridging the semantic gap in machine introspection. It may be determined that a program executed by a first virtual machine is requested to introspect a second virtual machine. A system call execution context of the program may be determined in response to determining that the program is requested to introspect the second virtual machine. Redirectable data in a memory of the second virtual machine may be identified based at least in part on the system call execution context of the program. The program may be configured to access the redirectable data. In various embodiments, the program may be able to modify the redirectable data, thereby facilitating configuration, reconfiguration, and recovery operations to be performed on the second virtual machine from within the first virtual machine.Board of Regents, University of Texas Syste
Elimination of Bias in Introspection: Methodological Advances, Refinements, and Recommendations
Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed
Providing Self-Aware Systems with Reflexivity
We propose a new type of self-aware systems inspired by ideas from
higher-order theories of consciousness. First, we discussed the crucial
distinction between introspection and reflexion. Then, we focus on
computational reflexion as a mechanism by which a computer program can inspect
its own code at every stage of the computation. Finally, we provide a formal
definition and a proof-of-concept implementation of computational reflexion,
viewed as an enriched form of program interpretation and a way to dynamically
"augment" a computational process.Comment: 12 pages plus bibliography, appendices with code description, code of
the proof-of-concept implementation, and examples of executio
Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters
Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, knowledge requires evidence, and there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske’s theory is meant to show how,, and can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2
Attainable Knowledge
The article investigates an evidence-based semantics for epistemic logics in
which pieces of evidence are interpreted as equivalence relations on the
epistemic worlds. It is shown that the properties of knowledge obtained from
potentially infinitely many pieces of evidence are described by modal logic S5.
At the same time, the properties of knowledge obtained from only a finite
number of pieces of evidence are described by modal logic S4. The main
technical result is a sound and complete bi-modal logical system that describes
properties of these two modalities and their interplay
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