Computing Socially-Efficient Cake Divisions

We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. For this setting, we address the problem of finding divisions that maximize the social welfare, focusing on divisions where each player needs to get one contiguous piece of the cake. We show that for both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social welfare functions it is NP-hard to find the optimal division. For the utilitarian welfare, we provide a constant factor approximation algorithm, and prove that no FPTAS is possible unless P=NP. For egalitarian welfare, we prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimum to any factor smaller than 2. For the case where the number of players is small, we provide an FPT (fixed parameter tractable) FPTAS for both the utilitarian and the egalitarian welfare objectives

Redividing the Cake

A heterogeneous resource, such as a land-estate, is already divided among several agents in an unfair way. It should be re-divided among the agents in a way that balances fairness with ownership rights. We present re-division protocols that attain various trade-off points between fairness and ownership rights, in various settings differing in the geometric constraints on the allotments: (a) no geometric constraints; (b) connectivity --- the cake is a one-dimensional interval and each piece must be a contiguous interval; (c) rectangularity --- the cake is a two-dimensional rectangle or rectilinear polygon and the pieces should be rectangles; (d) convexity --- the cake is a two-dimensional convex polygon and the pieces should be convex. Our re-division protocols have implications on another problem: the price-of-fairness --- the loss of social welfare caused by fairness requirements. Each protocol implies an upper bound on the price-of-fairness with the respective geometric constraints.Comment: Extended IJCAI 2018 version. Previous name: "How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly