On The Dynamic Timescale Of Mind-Brain Interaction

In neurophysiology it is widely assumed that our mind operates in millisecond timescale. This view might be wrong, because if consciousness is quantum coherent phenomenon at the level of protein assemblies, then its dynamic timescale can be picosecond one

A linkage of mind and brain: Sir John Eccles and modern dualistic interactionism

Our minds, constituted by conscious experiences, are both the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives. Despite the large amount of clinical evidence suggesting an intimate relationship between the brain function and the mind, the nature of this relationship remains poorly understood. In this Commentary we discuss some of the problems faced by the classical mind-brain identity theory and explain how the quantum dualistic interactionism proposed by Sir John Eccles could resolve these problems.Biomedical Reviews 2011; 22: 81-84

Quantum interactive dualism: From Beck and Eccles tunneling model of exocytosis to molecular biology of SNARE zipping

We commence this review by outlining the challenges faced by physical theories of consciousness and briefly describe the two main approaches based on classical or quantum mechanics. Next, we provide a detailed exposition of the motivation, the theoretical construction and experimental falsification of the celebrated model due to Beck and Eccles concerning mind-brain interaction purported to operate at the sites of neurotransmitter release in the brain. Finally, we propose our own model of a vibrationally assisted quantum tunneling mechanism involving a Davydov soliton propagating along the hydrogen bonds in the protein four-α-helix bundle of the SNARE complex (soluble NSF attachment protein receptor; NSF, N-ethylmaleimide sensitive fusion proteins) that drives synaptic vesicle fusion. We also discuss the possible experimental tests that could falsify our model. Since erasure of consciousness by volatile anesthetics results from binding to the hydrophobic core of the SNARE four-α-helix bundle, our model is well suited to support quantum interactive dualism.Biomedical Reviews 2014; 25: 15-24

Synapses, quantum theory and panpsychism

The introduction situates the ‘hard problem’ in its historical context and argues that the problem has two sides: the output side (the Kant-Eccles problem of the freedom of the Will) and the input side (the problem of qualia). The output side ultimately reduces to whether quantum mechanics can affect the operation of synapses. A discussion of the detailed molecular biology of synaptic transmission as presently understood suggests that such affects are unlikely. Instead an evolutionary argument is presented which suggests that our conviction of free agency is an evolutionarily induced illusion and hence that the Kant-Eccles problem is itself illusory. This conclusion is supported by well-known neurophysiology. The input side, the problem of qualia, of subjectivity, is not so easily outflanked. After a brief review of the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness (NCC) and of the Penrose-Hameroff microtubular neuroquantology it is again concluded that the molecular neurobiology makes quantum wave-mechanics an unlikely explanation. Instead recourse is made to an evolutionarily- and neurobiologically-informed panpsychism. The notion of an ‘emergent’ property is carefully distinguished from that of the more usual ‘system’ property used by most dual-aspect theorists (and the majority of neuroscientists) and used to support Llinas’ concept of an ‘oneiric’ consciousness continuously modified by sensory input. I conclude that a panpsychist theory, such as this, coupled with the non-classical understanding of matter flowing from quantum physics (both epistemological and scientific) may be the default and only solution to the problem posed by the presence of mind in a world of things

Does Consciousness-Collapse Quantum Mechanics Facilitate Dualistic Mental Causation?

One of the most serious challenges (if not the most serious challenge) for interactive psycho-physical dualism (henceforth interactive dualism or ID) is the so-called ‘interaction problem’. It has two facets, one of which this article focuses on, namely the apparent tension between interactions of non-physical minds in the physical world and physical laws of nature. One family of approaches to alleviate or even dissolve this tension is based on a collapse solution (‘consciousness collapse/CC) of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM). The idea is that the mind brings about the collapse of a superposed wave function onto one of its eigenstates. Thus, it is claimed, can the mind change the course of things without violating any law figuring in physical theory. I will first show that this hope is premature because energy and momentum are probably not conserved in collapse processes, and that even if this can be dealt with, the violations are either severe or produce further ontological problems. Second, I point out several conceptual difficulties for interactionist CC. I will also present solutions for those problems, but it will become clear that those solutions come at a high cost. Third, I shall briefly list some empirical problems which make life even harder for interactionist CC. I conclude with remarks about why no- collapse interpretations of QM don’t help either and what the present study has shown is the real issue for ID: namely to find a plausible integrative view of dualistic mental causation and laws of nature

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Interacting Minds in the Physical Wordl

Mental causation, idea that it is us – via our minds – who cause bodily actions is as commonsensical as it is indispensable for our understanding of ourselves as rational agents. Somewhat less uncontroversial, but nonetheless widespread (at least among ordinary people) is the idea that the mind is non-physical, following the intuition that what is physical can neither act nor think nor judge morally. Taken together, and cast into a metaphysical thesis, the two intuitions yield interactive dualism: the view that human persons and their minds are non-physical but can nonetheless interact with their bodies, most notably through their brains. This thesis has two main objectives: first, to defend interactive dualism against objections, and second, to show how it can blend in with a physical world in which laws of nature hold. The first part (chapter 1) consists in a brief motivation of interactive dualism as opposed to non-interactive dualism. I argue that non-interactive, epiphenomenalist dualism sacrifices so many crucial aspects of our human existence that interactive dualism is highly to be preferred to it, barring even stronger counterarguments against the latter. It is those putative counterarguments I address in parts II and III. Part II takes on the philosophical objections from the causal closure of the physical and from causal heterogeneity. The former takes the success of physics and physiology as basis for the doctrine of the causal closure of the physical (CCP). I argue against this that there is not only no convincing argument for CCP, but also that any science-based belief in CCP cannot be epistemically justified. As regards the causal heterogeneity objection, it is ‘weighed and found wanting’, because it relies on unwarranted assumptions about causation. In part III, I examine the objection from energy conservation. It roughly says that if interactive dualism were true, then energy would not be conserved, which physics taught us cannot be the case. My reply is that the underlying conception of energy (and momentum) conservation is wrong-headed and not the one that actual physicists use. Instead of being categorical and global, conservation laws are conditional and local, thereby making natural room for mental interaction. Some dualists, however, have sought to make interactive dualism conservation-friendly, notably by invoking quantum physics; I show that these attempts are unnecessary and create more problems than they solve. Finally, in chapter 9, I turn the tables on non-interactionists by investigating current neurophysiological literature on volitional actions, which, though not addressing the question directly, still encourages the interactive dualist picture more than a non-interactionist one. Part IV is about the interplay between interactive dualism and the laws of nature. The ultimate goal is, if possible, to come up with a theory of the laws of nature that explains the lawlike behavior of nature and at the same time makes room for interaction. I begin by pointing out that the laws of nature are or at least should be what physicalists worry about (chapter 10). I then proceed with a historical survey on the development of the notion of laws of nature (chapter 11) that sheds light on its theistic origin. This is followed by an inquiry into the question how a law of nature could possibly be broken (chapter 12) and a survey of the extant metaphysical theories of the laws of nature with special regard to their receptivity to interaction (chapter 13). Finally, in chapter 14 I develop a theory of the laws of nature both faithful to their divine origin and the possibility of mental interaction: dispositionalist divine decretalism, a synthesis of dispositionalism and Jeffrey Koperski’s divine decretalism