Are Aquinas and Whitehead Metaphorical and Analogical All the Way Down?

The paper argues from the perspective of a significant strand of interpretation of Aquinas and from insights in cognitive linguistics that a fruitful dialogue between Whitehead and Thomism needs to take into account that metaphysics and talk about God are metaphorical and analogical all the way down. Cognitive linguistics provides an explanatory scheme for explaining how Aquinas’s tectonic use of analogy shifts the ground of our conventional fields of meanings to create space to conceptualize what otherwise would be beyond grasp and to make inferences possible that otherwise would be unthinkable. The essay concludes with a question, admittedly from a particular trajectory of Thomism and cognitive linguistics, about whether Whitehead’s conception of God adequately accounts for the radically metaphorical “imaginative leap” entailed in the Christian conception of God

Recursive Neural Networks Can Learn Logical Semantics

Tree-structured recursive neural networks (TreeRNNs) for sentence meaning have been successful for many applications, but it remains an open question whether the fixed-length representations that they learn can support tasks as demanding as logical deduction. We pursue this question by evaluating whether two such models---plain TreeRNNs and tree-structured neural tensor networks (TreeRNTNs)---can correctly learn to identify logical relationships such as entailment and contradiction using these representations. In our first set of experiments, we generate artificial data from a logical grammar and use it to evaluate the models' ability to learn to handle basic relational reasoning, recursive structures, and quantification. We then evaluate the models on the more natural SICK challenge data. Both models perform competitively on the SICK data and generalize well in all three experiments on simulated data, suggesting that they can learn suitable representations for logical inference in natural language

Don't Blame Distributional Semantics if it can't do Entailment

Distributional semantics has had enormous empirical success in Computational Linguistics and Cognitive Science in modeling various semantic phenomena, such as semantic similarity, and distributional models are widely used in state-of-the-art Natural Language Processing systems. However, the theoretical status of distributional semantics within a broader theory of language and cognition is still unclear: What does distributional semantics model? Can it be, on its own, a fully adequate model of the meanings of linguistic expressions? The standard answer is that distributional semantics is not fully adequate in this regard, because it falls short on some of the central aspects of formal semantic approaches: truth conditions, entailment, reference, and certain aspects of compositionality. We argue that this standard answer rests on a misconception: These aspects do not belong in a theory of expression meaning, they are instead aspects of speaker meaning, i.e., communicative intentions in a particular context. In a slogan: words do not refer, speakers do. Clearing this up enables us to argue that distributional semantics on its own is an adequate model of expression meaning. Our proposal sheds light on the role of distributional semantics in a broader theory of language and cognition, its relationship to formal semantics, and its place in computational models.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Computational Semantics (IWCS 2019), Gothenburg, Swede

A large annotated corpus for learning natural language inference

Understanding entailment and contradiction is fundamental to understanding natural language, and inference about entailment and contradiction is a valuable testing ground for the development of semantic representations. However, machine learning research in this area has been dramatically limited by the lack of large-scale resources. To address this, we introduce the Stanford Natural Language Inference corpus, a new, freely available collection of labeled sentence pairs, written by humans doing a novel grounded task based on image captioning. At 570K pairs, it is two orders of magnitude larger than all other resources of its type. This increase in scale allows lexicalized classifiers to outperform some sophisticated existing entailment models, and it allows a neural network-based model to perform competitively on natural language inference benchmarks for the first time.Comment: To appear at EMNLP 2015. The data will be posted shortly before the conference (the week of 14 Sep) at http://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/snli

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways