Political independence, accountability, and the quality of regulatory decision-making

Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system

Abuse of dominance under the Egyptian Competition Law: investigating peculiarities that may have special effects in the economy

This paper investigates peculiarities in the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition Law and evaluates their potential effects in the economy. Particularly, it recognizes the lack of excessive pricing prohibition and the deployment of effects-based approach to abuse of dominance at the present stage as likely peculiarities in Egyptian Competition Law that may harm the economy. It is specifically argued that the success of the practice of excessive pricing, at least in exceptional circumstances, may become more plausible at this stage in Egypt, as an emerging economy, since it lacks the necessary competition culture and, as such, its market is highly concentrated. The paper, furthermore, finds that employing an effects-based approach at this early stage of competition law enforcement may not be suitable due to the understandable lack of experience that may increase the likelihood of committing judicial errors. It is, however, perceived that investigating the practice of excessive pricing is quite complex and, as such prohibiting it may not be the best initiative at this stage. Moreover, it is suggested that employing an effects-based analysis, as opposed to per se approach, may help avoid type II errors (erroneously condemning pro-competitive practices). It is, hence, suggested to stick by this approach at the current stage; so long as caution is taken in relation to practices that generate questionable anti-competitive effects. Whether for introducing an excessive pricing prohibition in the future (should the practice continue to pose a threat) or employing effects-based approach, it is argued that increasing economic expertise in the field of competition law and cooperating with competition authorities of the developed world remains central

Competition for status acquisition in public good games

This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contri- butions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in standard models where status is not considered, and their donation is increasing in the value they assign to status. In addition, players'contributions are increasing in the value that their opponents assign to status, reflecting donors' intense competition to gain social status. Furthermore, I consider contributors'equilibrium strategies both in simultaneous and sequen- tial contribution mechanisms. Then, I compare total contributions in both of these mechanisms. I find that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total contributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are sufficiently homogeneous in the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest contributions. Updated 6-03-09.Public goods games, Status acquisition, Competition.

The 2019 Intraschool Negotiation Competition and Informational Meetings

https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/event-invitations-2019/1013/thumbnail.jp