Approximation Algorithms for Union and Intersection Covering Problems

In a classical covering problem, we are given a set of requests that we need to satisfy (fully or partially), by buying a subset of items at minimum cost. For example, in the k-MST problem we want to find the cheapest tree spanning at least k nodes of an edge-weighted graph. Here nodes and edges represent requests and items, respectively. In this paper, we initiate the study of a new family of multi-layer covering problems. Each such problem consists of a collection of h distinct instances of a standard covering problem (layers), with the constraint that all layers share the same set of requests. We identify two main subfamilies of these problems: - in a union multi-layer problem, a request is satisfied if it is satisfied in at least one layer; - in an intersection multi-layer problem, a request is satisfied if it is satisfied in all layers. To see some natural applications, consider both generalizations of k-MST. Union k-MST can model a problem where we are asked to connect a set of users to at least one of two communication networks, e.g., a wireless and a wired network. On the other hand, intersection k-MST can formalize the problem of connecting a subset of users to both electricity and water. We present a number of hardness and approximation results for union and intersection versions of several standard optimization problems: MST, Steiner tree, set cover, facility location, TSP, and their partial covering variants

Bi-Criteria and Approximation Algorithms for Restricted Matchings

In this work we study approximation algorithms for the \textit{Bounded Color Matching} problem (a.k.a. Restricted Matching problem) which is defined as follows: given a graph in which each edge $e$ has a color $c_e$ and a profit $p_e \in \mathbb{Q}^+$, we want to compute a maximum (cardinality or profit) matching in which no more than $w_j \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ edges of color $c_j$ are present. This kind of problems, beside the theoretical interest on its own right, emerges in multi-fiber optical networking systems, where we interpret each unique wavelength that can travel through the fiber as a color class and we would like to establish communication between pairs of systems. We study approximation and bi-criteria algorithms for this problem which are based on linear programming techniques and, in particular, on polyhedral characterizations of the natural linear formulation of the problem. In our setting, we allow violations of the bounds $w_j$ and we model our problem as a bi-criteria problem: we have two objectives to optimize namely (a) to maximize the profit (maximum matching) while (b) minimizing the violation of the color bounds. We prove how we can "beat" the integrality gap of the natural linear programming formulation of the problem by allowing only a slight violation of the color bounds. In particular, our main result is \textit{constant} approximation bounds for both criteria of the corresponding bi-criteria optimization problem

Approximation Schemes for Multi-Budgeted Independence Systems

A natural way to deal with multiple, partially conflicting objectives is turning all the objectives but one into budget constraints. Some classical optimization problems, such as spanning tree and forest, shortest path, (perfect) matching, independent set (basis) in a matroid or in the intersection of two matroids, become NP-hard even with one budget constraint. Still, for most of these problems efficient deterministic and randomized approximation schemes are known. For two or more bud-gets, typically only multi-criteria approximation schemes are available, which return slightly infeasible solutions. Not much is known however for strict budget constraints: filling this gap is the main goal of this paper. It is not hard to see that the above-mentioned problems whose solution sets do not correspond to independence systems are inapproximable al-ready for two budget constraints. For the remaining problems, we present approximation schemes for a constant number k of budget constraints using a variety of techniques: i) we present a simple and powerful mech-anism to transform multi-criteria approximation schemes into pure ap-proximation schemes. This leads to deterministic and randomized ap-proximation schemes for various of the above-mentioned problems; ii) we show that points in low-dimensional faces of any matroid polytope are almost integral, an interesting result on its own. This gives a de-terministic approximation scheme for k-budgeted matroid independent set; iii) we present a deterministic approximation scheme for 2-budgeted matching. The backbone of this result is a purely topological property of curves in R2

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions in the field is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with `small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" Singer showed that additive and submodular functions have such constant approximations. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer gave an O(log^2 n)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions; they also remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions." We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. For the prior-free framework, we use an LP that describes the fractional cover of the valuation function; it is also connected to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory. We provide an O(I)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions, via the worst case integrality gap I of LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, and for valuations with a constant I. XOS valuations are an important class of functions that lie between submodular and subadditive classes. We give another polynomial time O(log n/loglog n) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive valuations. For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subadditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine. Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally truthful.Comment: to appear in STOC 201