15 research outputs found
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design
In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to
a population of potential experiment subjects , each
associated with a vector of features . Conducting an experiment
with subject reveals an unknown value to E. E typically assumes
some hypothetical relationship between 's and 's, e.g., , and estimates from experiments, e.g., through linear
regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a
subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment.
We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this
setting, E has a budget . Each subject declares an associated cost to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In
particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set of
subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in
S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint ; our objective
function corresponds to the information gain in parameter that is
learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called
-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about
their costs.
We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism
scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor
approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small and , we can construct a (12.98, )-approximate mechanism that is
-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both and
. We also establish that no truthful,
budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and
show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems,
beyond linear regression
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of
budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of
resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the
same time maximize a given valuation function. This framework captures the
budgeted version of several well known optimization problems, and when the
resources are owned by strategic agents the goal is to design truthful and
budget feasible mechanisms, i.e. elicit the true cost of the resources and
ensure the payments of the mechanism do not exceed the budget. Budget
feasibility introduces more challenges in mechanism design, and we study
instantiations of this problem for certain classes of submodular and XOS
valuation functions. We first obtain mechanisms with an improved approximation
ratio for weighted coverage valuations, a special class of submodular functions
that has already attracted attention in previous works. We then provide a
general scheme for designing randomized and deterministic polynomial time
mechanisms for a class of XOS problems. This class contains problems whose
feasible set forms an independence system (a more general structure than
matroids), and some representative problems include, among others, finding
maximum weighted matchings, maximum weighted matroid members, and maximum
weighted 3D-matchings. For most of these problems, only randomized mechanisms
with very high approximation ratios were known prior to our results
Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement
We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents
for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price
future data and give learning guarantees even when an agent's cost for
revealing her data may depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We achieve this
goal by showing how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into
online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results in a sense parallel
classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource being money
rather than quantity of data: With a budget constraint , we give robust risk
(predictive error) bounds on the order of . Because we use an
active approach, we can often guarantee to do significantly better by
leveraging correlations between costs and data.
Our algorithms and analysis go through a model of no-regret learning with
arriving pairs (cost, data) and a budget constraint of . Our regret bounds
for this model are on the order of and we give lower bounds on the
same order.Comment: Full version of EC 2015 paper. Color recommended for figures but
nonessential. 36 pages, of which 12 appendi
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement
auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function
subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful
mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the
participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of
general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first
truthful, budget-feasible and -approximate mechanisms that run in
polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions.
Prior to our work, the only -approximation mechanism known for
non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value
queries.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone
submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two
candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet
ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly
enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem
where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal
value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online
setting as well.
To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the
case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain
-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular
objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a -system.
With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known
for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting
that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial
time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201
Truthful Linear Regression
We consider the problem of fitting a linear model to data held by individuals
who are concerned about their privacy. Incentivizing most players to truthfully
report their data to the analyst constrains our design to mechanisms that
provide a privacy guarantee to the participants; we use differential privacy to
model individuals' privacy losses. This immediately poses a problem, as
differentially private computation of a linear model necessarily produces a
biased estimation, and existing approaches to design mechanisms to elicit data
from privacy-sensitive individuals do not generalize well to biased estimators.
We overcome this challenge through an appropriate design of the computation and
payment scheme.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference on Learning
Theory (COLT 2015
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an
auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents.
Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to
maximize his valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the
resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design
mechanisms that are truthful, budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation
to the optimal value. Budget-feasibility creates additional challenges, making
several approaches inapplicable in this setting. Previous results on
budget-feasible mechanisms have considered mostly monotone valuation functions.
In this work, we mainly focus on symmetric submodular valuations, a prominent
class of non-monotone submodular functions that includes cut functions. We
begin first with a purely algorithmic result, obtaining a
-approximation for maximizing symmetric submodular functions
under a budget constraint. We view this as a standalone result of independent
interest, as it is the best known factor achieved by a deterministic algorithm.
We then proceed to propose truthful, budget feasible mechanisms (both
deterministic and randomized), paying particular attention on the Budgeted Max
Cut problem. Our results significantly improve the known approximation ratios
for these objectives, while establishing polynomial running time for cases
where only exponential mechanisms were known. At the heart of our approach lies
an appropriate combination of local search algorithms with results for monotone
submodular valuations, applied to the derived local optima.Comment: A conference version appears in WINE 201