3 research outputs found

    Bounding the number of agents, for equivalence too

    Get PDF
    International audienceBounding the number of agents is a current practice when modeling a protocol. In 2003, it has been shown that one honest agent and one dishonest agent are indeed sufficient to find all possible attacks, for secrecy properties. This is no longer the case for equivalence properties , crucial to express many properties such as vote privacy or untrace-ability. In this paper, we show that it is sufficient to consider two honest agents and two dishonest agents for equivalence properties, for deterministic processes with standard primitives and without else branches. More generally , we show how to bound the number of agents for arbitrary con-structor theories and for protocols with simple else branches. We show that our hypotheses are tight, providing counterexamples for non action-deterministic processes, non constructor theories, or protocols with complex else branches

    When Are Three Voters Enough for Privacy Properties?

    Get PDF
    International audienceProtocols for secure electronic voting are of increasing societal importance. Proving rigorously their security is more challenging than many other protocols, which aim at authentication or key exchange. One of the reasons is that they need to be secure for an arbitrary number of malicious voters. In this paper we identify a class of voting protocols for which only a small number of agents needs to be considered: if there is an attack on vote privacy then there is also an attack that involves at most 3 voters (2 honest voters and 1 dishonest voter). In the case where the protocol allows a voter to cast several votes and counts, e.g., only the last one, we also reduce the number of ballots required for an attack to 10, and under some additional hypotheses, 7 ballots. Our results are formalised and proven in a symbolic model based on the applied pi calculus. We illustrate the applicability of our results on several case studies, including different versions of Helios and PrĂȘt-` a-Voter, as well as the JCJ protocol. For some of these protocols we can use the ProVerif tool to provide the first formal proofs of privacy for an unbounded number of voters

    A small bound on the number of sessions for security protocols

    Get PDF
    International audienceBounding the number of sessions is a long-standing problem in the context of security protocols. It is well known that even simple properties like secrecy are undecidable when an unbounded number of sessions is considered. Yet, attacks on existing protocols only require a few sessions.In this paper, we propose a sound algorithm that computes a sufficient set of scenarios that need to be considered to detect an attack. Our approach can be applied for both reachability and equivalence properties, for protocols with standard primitives thatare type-compliant (unifiable messages have the same type). Moreover, when equivalence properties are considered, else branches are disallowed, and protocols are supposed to be simple (an attacker knows from which role and session a message comes from).Since this class remains undecidable, ouralgorithm may return an infinite set. However, our experiments show that on most basic protocols of the literature, our algorithm computesa small number of sessions (a dozen). As a consequence, tools for a bounded number of sessions like DeepSec can then be used to conclude that a protocol is secure for an unbounded number of sessions
    corecore