425 research outputs found

    OnionBots: Subverting Privacy Infrastructure for Cyber Attacks

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    Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets, ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets. OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement, OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

    Botnet Detection using Social Graph Analysis

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    Signature-based botnet detection methods identify botnets by recognizing Command and Control (C\&C) traffic and can be ineffective for botnets that use new and sophisticate mechanisms for such communications. To address these limitations, we propose a novel botnet detection method that analyzes the social relationships among nodes. The method consists of two stages: (i) anomaly detection in an "interaction" graph among nodes using large deviations results on the degree distribution, and (ii) community detection in a social "correlation" graph whose edges connect nodes with highly correlated communications. The latter stage uses a refined modularity measure and formulates the problem as a non-convex optimization problem for which appropriate relaxation strategies are developed. We apply our method to real-world botnet traffic and compare its performance with other community detection methods. The results show that our approach works effectively and the refined modularity measure improves the detection accuracy.Comment: 7 pages. Allerton Conferenc

    Reaction to New Security Threat Class

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    Each new identified security threat class triggers new research and development efforts by the scientific and professional communities. In this study, we investigate the rate at which the scientific and professional communities react to new identified threat classes as it is reflected in the number of patents, scientific articles and professional publications over a long period of time. The following threat classes were studied: Phishing; SQL Injection; BotNet; Distributed Denial of Service; and Advanced Persistent Threat. Our findings suggest that in most cases it takes a year for the scientific community and more than two years for industry to react to a new threat class with patents. Since new products follow patents, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a window of approximately two to three years in which no effective product is available to cope with the new threat class

    Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences

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    In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks, highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control (C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages. Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor

    Master of Puppets: Analyzing And Attacking A Botnet For Fun And Profit

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    A botnet is a network of compromised machines (bots), under the control of an attacker. Many of these machines are infected without their owners' knowledge, and botnets are the driving force behind several misuses and criminal activities on the Internet (for example spam emails). Depending on its topology, a botnet can have zero or more command and control (C&C) servers, which are centralized machines controlled by the cybercriminal that issue commands and receive reports back from the co-opted bots. In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of the command and control infrastructure of one of the world's largest proprietary spamming botnets between 2007 and 2012: Cutwail/Pushdo. We identify the key functionalities needed by a spamming botnet to operate effectively. We then develop a number of attacks against the command and control logic of Cutwail that target those functionalities, and make the spamming operations of the botnet less effective. This analysis was made possible by having access to the source code of the C&C software, as well as setting up our own Cutwail C&C server, and by implementing a clone of the Cutwail bot. With the help of this tool, we were able to enumerate the number of bots currently registered with the C&C server, impersonate an existing bot to report false information to the C&C server, and manipulate spamming statistics of an arbitrary bot stored in the C&C database. Furthermore, we were able to make the control server inaccessible by conducting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Our results may be used by law enforcement and practitioners to develop better techniques to mitigate and cripple other botnets, since many of findings are generic and are due to the workflow of C&C communication in general
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