The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited

One of the most robust empirical regularities in the political economy of trade is the persistence of protection. This paper explains persistent protection in terms of the interaction between industry adjustment, lobbying, and the political response. Faced with a trade shock, owners of industry-specific factors can undertake costly adjustment, or they can lobby politicians for protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment. The choice depends on the returns from adjusting relative to lobbying. By introducing an explicit lobbying process, it can be shown that the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs. Since current adjustment diminishes future lobbying intensity, and protection reduces adjustment, current protection raises future protection. This simple lobbying feedback effect has an important dynamic resource allocation effect: declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust. In addition, the model makes clear that the type of collapse predicted by Cassing and Hillman (1986) is only possible under special conditions, such as a fixed cost to lobbying. The paper also considers the symmetric case of lobbying in growing industries.

Collective Origin of the Coexistence of Apparent RMT Noise and Factors in Large Sample Correlation Matrices

Through simple analytical calculations and numerical simulations, we demonstrate the generic existence of a self-organized macroscopic state in any large multivariate system possessing non-vanishing average correlations between a finite fraction of all pairs of elements. The coexistence of an eigenvalue spectrum predicted by random matrix theory (RMT) and a few very large eigenvalues in large empirical correlation matrices is shown to result from a bottom-up collective effect of the underlying time series rather than a top-down impact of factors. Our results, in excellent agreement with previous results obtained on large financial correlation matrices, show that there is relevant information also in the bulk of the eigenvalue spectrum and rationalize the presence of market factors previously introduced in an ad hoc manner.Comment: 4 pages with 3 figur

Computational Economics: Help for the Underestimated Undergraduate

Our concern in this paper is that the capability of economics undergraduates is substantially underestimated in the design of the present college curriculum and that our students are insufficiently challenged and motivated. Students enter our classrooms with substantial previous knowledge about computers and computation and we are not taking full advantage of this opportunity. We suggest a set of examples from computational economics which are challenging enough to motivate students and simple enough that they can master them within a few hours. By encouraging the students to modify the models in directions of their own interest avenues for creative endeavor are opened which deeply involve the students in their own education.teaching computational economics

When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from "La Violencia", a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946-1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with our results, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.