Preventing Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks on the IMS Emergency Services Support through Adaptive Firewall Pinholing

Emergency services are vital services that Next Generation Networks (NGNs) have to provide. As the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is in the heart of NGNs, 3GPP has carried the burden of specifying a standardized IMS-based emergency services framework. Unfortunately, like any other IP-based standards, the IMS-based emergency service framework is prone to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. We propose in this work, a simple but efficient solution that can prevent certain types of such attacks by creating firewall pinholes that regular clients will surely be able to pass in contrast to the attackers clients. Our solution was implemented, tested in an appropriate testbed, and its efficiency was proven.Comment: 17 Pages, IJNGN Journa

SecSip: A Stateful Firewall for SIP-based Networks

SIP-based networks are becoming the de-facto standard for voice, video and instant messaging services. Being exposed to many threats while playing an major role in the operation of essential services, the need for dedicated security management approaches is rapidly increasing. In this paper we present an original security management approach based on a specific vulnerability aware SIP stateful firewall. Through known attack descriptions, we illustrate the power of the configuration language of the firewall which uses the capability to specify stateful objects that track data from multiple SIP elements within their lifetime. We demonstrate through measurements on a real implementation of the firewall its efficiency and performance

Intrusion detection mechanisms for VoIP applications

VoIP applications are emerging today as an important component in business and communication industry. In this paper, we address the intrusion detection and prevention in VoIP networks and describe how a conceptual solution based on the Bayes inference approach can be used to reinforce the existent security mechanisms. Our approach is based on network monitoring and analyzing of the VoIP-specific traffic. We give a detailed example on attack detection using the SIP signaling protocol

VoIP security - attacks and solutions

Voice over IP (VoIP) technology is being extensively and rapidly deployed. Flexibility and cost efficiency are the key factors luring enterprises to transition to VoIP. Some security problems may surface with the widespread deployment of VoIP. This article presents an overview of VoIP systems and its security issues. First, we briefly describe basic VoIP architecture and its fundamental differences compared to PSTN. Next, basic VoIP protocols used for signaling and media transport, as well as defense mechanisms are described. Finally, current and potential VoIP attacks along with the approaches that have been adopted to counter the attacks are discussed

Secure communication and VoIP threats in next generation networks

VoIP services are among key issues in the Next Generation Network (NGN) for the telecommunication domain. This technology is comprised of positive and negative aspects like similar emerging technologies. Nowadays, telecom operators provide call waiting, conference calling, call transfer, caller ID and other VoIP services based on NGN and all IP solution. Thus, VoIP security is now one of the issues over which many debates take place. In this paper we have decided to concentrate on vulnerability categories for VoIP services in NGN. We try to present the common security threats and vulnerabilities of VoIP services. Determining the vulnerabilities and their classification, together with the risks that this system is threatened by clarifies the ways to penetrate this system and enables administrators to solve the problems. The debate on this matter would be misleading without having full recognition of various specifications. In addition, to make the importance of identifying these types of vulnerabilities clear, we will classify the probability threats for VoIP.Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike Licensefi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety of VoIP products. We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service, and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from the research community. We also find that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an indication of the issues in future large-scale systems

Securing VoIP: A Framework to Mitigate or Manage Risks

In Australia, the past few years have seen Voice over IP (VoIP) move from a niche communications medium used by organisations with the appropriate infrastructure and capabilities to a technology that is available to any one with a good broadband connection. Driven by low cost and no cost phone calls, easy to use VoIP clients and increasingly reliable connections, VoIP is replacing the Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) in a growing number of households. VoIP adoption appears to be following a similar path to early Internet adoption, namely little awareness by users of the security implications. Lack of concern about security by VoIP users is probably due to the relatively risk free service provided by the PSTN. However, VoIP applications use the Internet as their communications medium and therefore the risk profile is significantly different to the PSTN. This paper reviews the risks for two VoIP implementation models now being increasingly used in Australian homes; the PC softphone and the Analogue Telephony Adaptor (ATA). An overview of each of the VoIP implementation models is given together with a description of the respective technologies and protocols utilised. The VoIP security threats, applicable to the two VoIP implementation models considered, are enumerated and vulnerabilities that could be exploited are considered. Available security mechanisms that address the identified vulnerabilities are discussed. A practical and pragmatic VoIP security framework is proposed that will enable a user to mitigate or manage the risks associated with using the VoIP implementation models considered. By applying the VoIP security framework a user will be able to deploy a secure VoIP solution appropriate for residential use