19,899 research outputs found
Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction
We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders
is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium
strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders
instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the
values are different. We derive su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence
The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were initiated in John Kagel and Dan Levin (1984, 1986) and Douglas Dyer et al. (1989). The common-value auction involves firms bidding for an item of unknown common value. Since the value of the item is unknown, the winners can bid more than the value and thereby lose money. The winner's curse occurs if the winners of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses. The phenomenon is said to occur possibly in the bidding for such natural resources as mineral rights, where the value of the mineral is unknown but each firm has an estimate of the value. Due to the field nature of the data, doubts have existed as to the actual existence of the curse. The Kagel and Levin (1986) paper tested for the existence of the phenomenon in a laboratory setting. The hope is that, by achieving a thorough understanding of the phenomenon as it might exist in simple laboratory environments, economists will become better equipped to identify and study the phenomenon in more-complex field settings
Lowest Unique Bid Auctions
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have
achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of
euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique
bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes
a bid, she gets to know whether her bid was unique and whether it was the
lowest unique. Information is updated in real time, but every bidder sees only
what's relevant to the bids she made. We show that the observed behavior in
these auctions differs considerably from what theory would prescribe if all
bidders were fully rational. We show that the seller makes money, which would
not be the case with rational bidders, and some bidders win the auctions quite
often. We describe a possible strategy for these bidders
On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions
Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects. In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprisesPublicad
The Timing of Bid Placement and Extent of Multiple Bidding: An Empirical Investigation Using eBay Online Auctions
Online auctions are fast gaining popularity in today's electronic commerce.
Relative to offline auctions, there is a greater degree of multiple bidding and
late bidding in online auctions, an empirical finding by some recent research.
These two behaviors (multiple bidding and late bidding) are of ``strategic''
importance to online auctions and hence important to investigate. In this
article we empirically measure the distribution of bid timings and the extent
of multiple bidding in a large set of online auctions, using bidder experience
as a mediating variable. We use data from the popular auction site
\url{www.eBay.com} to investigate more than 10,000 auctions from 15 consumer
product categories. We estimate the distribution of late bidding and multiple
bidding, which allows us to place these product categories along a continuum of
these metrics (the extent of late bidding and the extent of multiple bidding).
Interestingly, the results of the analysis distinguish most of the product
categories from one another with respect to these metrics, implying that
product categories, after controlling for bidder experience, differ in the
extent of multiple bidding and late bidding observed in them. We also find a
nonmonotonic impact of bidder experience on the timing of bid placements.
Experienced bidders are ``more'' active either toward the close of auction or
toward the start of auction. The impact of experience on the extent of multiple
bidding, though, is monotonic across the auction interval; more experienced
bidders tend to indulge ``less'' in multiple bidding.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000123 in the
Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org
The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were initiated in John Kagel and Dan Levin (1984, 1986) and Douglas Dyer et al. (1989). The common-value auction involves firms bidding for an item of unknown common value. Since the value of the item is unknown, the winners can bid more than the value and thereby lose money. The winner's curse occurs if the winners of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the objects and thereby systematically incur losses. The phenomenon is said to occur possibly in the bidding for such natural resources as mineral rights, where the value of the mineral is unknown but each firm has an estimate of the value. Due to the field nature of the data, doubts have existed as to the actual existence of the curse. The Kagel and Levin (1986) paper tested for the existence of the phenomenon in a laboratory setting. The hope is that, by achieving a thorough understanding of the phenomenon as it might exist in simple laboratory environments, economists will become better equipped to identify and study the phenomenon in more-complex field settings
The European UTMS/IMT2000 license auctions
We survey the recent European UMTS license auctions and compare
their outcomes with the predictions of a simple model that emphasizes future
market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the
main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic efficiency, and
since consumers (who are affected by the ensuing market structure) do not
participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate the asymmetry
among incumbents and potential entrants by actively encouraging entry
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