Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent

TAC-02 was the third in a series of Trading Agent Competition events fostering research in automating trading strategies by showcasing alternate approaches in an open-invitation market game. TAC presents a challenging travel-shopping scenario where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable goods by interacting through a variety of market types. Michigan's entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy. Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine solves in each round of bidding for each good. Walverine's optimal bidding approach, as well as several other features of its overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of trading environments.trading agent, trading competition, tatonnement, competitive equilibrium

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations

Multiple-round timber auction design and simulation

This paper presents a multiple-round timber auction simulation, developed in order to study various configurations of auction design. In this study, simultaneous sequential timber auctions are modelled and analysed using agent-based simulation technology. As there are many individual items in the auction to be sold, the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre-defined intervals. At each round, the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions. Since bidders are offered different items at each round, a mathematical linear programing model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented. Different bidding patterns are simulated and compared in various setup configurations. The most advanced of these strategies are adaptive and use agent-learning capability. The comparisons include the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3. This study suggests an efficient bidding pattern for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit. Similarly, in order to increase profit, the auctioneer (i.e. the government) needs to control several auction parameters including the number of auctions per year, the lot size, the auction periodicity, and the number of bidders. This study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximise revenue for the auctioneer

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations

Timber Auction Simulation and Design

RÉSUMÉ : La commercialisation sous forme de vente aux enchères publique du bois provenant de forêts, comme dans la province de Québec, est une tâche difficile. En effet, il est crucial de déterminer les prix représentatifs de la vente aux enchères de bois dans toutes les régions du Québec afin de permettre à plus d'acheteurs potentiels d'accéder au marché. De même, il est également important de concevoir un système d'enchères qui est bénéfique pour les entreprises forestières et les gens de Québec. La vente unitaire, dans lequel les utilisateurs de bois autorisés à soumissionner pour le lot entier, est actuellement appliquée comme une méthode de vente aux enchères. Dans ce système de vente aux enchères du bois, les utilisateurs de bois sont responsables de la récolte de la totalité du lot et pour la revente espèces ligneuses indésirables à d'autres utilisateurs. Dans ce projet, nous analysons d'abord différentes configurations d’enchères à rondes multiples de type premier prix sous pli scellé, tel que proposé par le ministère des Ressources naturelles du Québec, afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique et les facteurs dominants de la réussite de ce type de mécanisme d'allocation de bois. Pour cela, nous utilisons la simulation à base d'agents pour modéliser et simuler des ventes aux enchères, en proposant notamment des comportements de soumissionnaires réalistes, incluant des stratégies d'adaptation et d'apprentissage, qui ont été simulées et comparées dans diverses configurations. Les comparaisons ont été menées en mesurant notamment le taux de succès de gagner l'enchère et le prix unitaire remporté en $/m3. Cette étude suggère également des configurations de paramètres permettant maximiser les recettes pour le commissaire-priseur. À l’étape suivante de la recherche, cette thèse présente la simulation de la vente de plusieurs sortes de bois rond en utilisant une méthode d’enchères combinatoires. Dans ce processus de vente, les soumissionnaires peuvent avoir besoin d’une combinaison des produits. En utilisant l'approche par simulation, les résultats montrent que les revenus générés par enchère combinatoire peuvent être plus élevés que le revenu de l’enchère unitaire. Afin d'effectuer une analyse de sensibilité, les expériences sont répétées et testés avec diverses combinaisons de quatre paramètres de configuration. Les résultats de l'analyse permettent d’évaluer dans quel contexte l’enchère combinatoire peut faire mieux que l’enchère unitaire, et cela dans différents marchés. Enfin, cette thèse présente un système d'enchères combinatoires qui alloue le bois aux soumissionnaires afin d'améliorer la coordination des dépendances entre les soumissionnaires retenus dans les zones forestières mixtes (c’est à dire avec plusieurs types de produits et utilisateurs potentiels). Pour supporter la coordination des opérations et améliorer la fraicheur du bois, nous proposons une vente aux enchères combinatoire, qui permet aux soumissionnaires d’ajuster la valeur des offres en fonction du temps, via une sorte de calendriers. Cette enchère combinatoire permet ainsi au commissaire-priseur de trouver les meilleures combinaisons de soumissions gagnantes maximisant ainsi les préférences temporelles des soumissionnaires. Pour cela, nous définissons un nouveau problème de détermination du vainqueur (WDP) qui utilise ces fonctions de valeur. Afin de comparer l’impact de diverses préférences temporelles, une analyse de sensibilité est menée. Mots-clés: enchères du bois, enchères séquentielles, la stratégie d'apprentissage, systèmes multi-agents, l'affectation enchères combinatoire, la coordination, la fraicheur du bois, et de problèmes de détermination du vainqueur.----------ABSTRACT : The marketing of wood obtained from forests in public auction, such as in the province of Québec, is a challenging task. Indeed, it is crucial to determine representative prices of the wood auction in all regions of Quebec in order to allow more potential buyers to access the market. Similarly, it is also important to design an auction system that is beneficial for forest companies and the people of Québec. Single-unit auction, in which timber users allowed to bid on the entire lot, is currently applied as a method of auction. In this timber auction system, timber users (i.e., winners) are responsible for harvesting the entire lot and for reselling unwanted timber species to other users. In this project, we first analyze various configurations of the multiple-round first-price sealed-bid auction of wood as proposed by the Québec Ministry of Natural Resources to better understand the dynamics and the dominant factors of success of this type of wood allocation mechanism. To do so, we use agent-based simulation to model and simulate auctions with realistic bidders’ behavior. Different bidding patterns including adaptive and learning strategies are then simulated and compared in various setup configurations. The comparisons have been conducted on the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3. This study also suggests parameter configurations to maximize revenue for the auctioneer. In the next step of research, in the last part, this thesis presents the simulation of multiple-round timber combinatorial auction as the bidders may need variety of species and the size of timber companies may be different. Using simulation approach, the results shows the revenue generated by combinatorial auction can be higher than the revenue of a single unit auction. In order to do sensitive analysis of the comparison, the experiments are repeated and tested with different setup configuration of four parameters. The results of analysis help to evaluate how combinatorial auction can perform better than single auction in different markets. Finally, we intend to present an auction system, which allocates wood to bidders in order to improve the coordination of the dependencies between winning bidders in mixed forest areas (i.e., wood lots with multiple users). To achieve the coordination of procurement operations and improve the freshness of the wood, we propose an auction, by allowing the value of bids to be expressed as a function of time, via some sort of timetables, and by using a combinatorial auction that will allow the auctioneer to find the best combinations of winning bids. In order to do that, we define a new winner determination problem (WDP) that use these value functions for coordination procurement and delivery operations and wood freshness. In order to compare the proposed time-based combinatorial auction with combinatorial auction a sensitive analysis is conducted. The comparison is done according to bidders’ and seller’s time flexibility. Keywords: timber auction, sequential auction, learning strategy, multi agent system, allocation combinatorial auction, coordination, wood freshness, and winner determination problem

Automated Markets and Trading Agents

Computer automation has the potential, just starting to be realized, of transforming the design and operation of markets, and the behaviors of agents trading in them. We discuss the possibilities for automating markets, presenting a broad conceptual framework covering resource allocation as well as enabling marketplace services such as search and transaction execution. One of the most intriguing opportunities is provided by markets implementing computationally sophisticated negotiation mechanisms, for example combinatorial auctions. An important theme that emerges from the literature is the centrality of design decisions about matching the domain of goods over which a mechanism operates to the domain over which agents have preferences. When the match is imperfect (as is almost inevitable), the market game induced by the mechanism is analytically intractable, and the literature provides an incomplete characterization of rational bidding policies. A review of the literature suggests that much of our existing knowledge comes from computational simulations, including controlled studies of abstract market designs (e.g., simultaneous ascending auctions), and research tournaments comparing agent strategies in a variety of market scenarios. An empirical game-theoretic methodology combines the advantages of simulation, agent-based modeling, and statistical and game-theoretic analysis.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49510/1/ace_galleys.pd