Axiomatic Bayesian Utilitarianism

L'article examine les relations qu'entretiennent les conditions suivantes, formulées dans la théorie axiomatique de la décision de Jeffrey-Bolker. (1) La condition utilitariste voulant que l'utilité espérée de la société se représente comme une somme pondérée des utilités espérées individuelles. (2) Des conditions d'uniformité imposées aux fonctions d'utilité et de probabilité des individus. On montre en particulier que l'identité des probabilités individuelles est nécessaire et suffisante pour que l'on obtienne l'utilitarisme, et qu'elle dérive d'une condition antérieure de type parétien reliant les préférences individuelles et sociales, pour autant que ces préférences soient séparables en un sens convenable.Principe de Pareto;Utilitarisme;Bayésianisme collectif;Bolker-Jeffrey;Savage;Théorèmes d'identité

Ambiguity Aversion behind the Veil of Ignorance

The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi's and Rawls' that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent's behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity---which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity---however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity

Utilitarianism with Prior Heterogeneity

URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2014.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.49 - ISSN : 1955-611XHarsanyi's axiomatic justification of utilitarianism is extended to a framework with subjective and heterogenous priors. Contrary to the existing literature on aggregation of preferences under uncertainty, society is here allowed to formulate probability judgements, not on the actual state of the world as individuals do, but rather on the opinion they each have on the actual state. An extended Pareto condition is then proposed that characterizes the social utility function as a convex combination of individual ones and the social prior as the independent product of individual ones.La justification axiomatique de l'utilitarisme d'Harsanyi est généralisée à un cadre dans lequel les croyances individuelles sont subjectives et hétérogènes. A l'inverse de la littérature existante sur l'agrégation de préférences en environnement incertain, la société formule des jugements de probabilité, non pas sur le véritable état du monde - ce que les individus font -, mais plutôt sur les opinions qu'entretiennent les individus à propos du véritable état du monde. Une forme étendue de la condition de Pareto est alors proposée et il est montré qu'elle caractérise l'utilité sociale en tant que combinaison convexe des utilités individuelles et la probabilité sociale en tant que produit indépendant des probabilités individuelles

Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements

This paper aims to address two issues related to simultaneous aggregation of utilities and beliefs. The first one is related to how to integrate both inequality and uncertainty considerations into social decision making. The second one is related to how social decision should take disagreements in beliefs into account. To accomplish this, whereas individuals are assumed to abide by Savage model’s of subjective expected utility, society is assumed to prescribe, either to each individual when the ex ante individual well-being is favored or to itself when the ex post individual well-being is favored, acting in accordance with the maximin expected utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153, 1989). Furthermore, it adapts an ex ante Pareto-type condition proposed by Gayer et al. (J Legal Stud 43:151–171, 2014), which says that a prospect Pareto dominates another one if the former gives a higher expected utility than the latter one, for each individual, for all individuals’ beliefs. In the context where the ex ante individual welfare is favored, our ex ante Pareto-type condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility taking the form of a MaxMinMin social welfare function, as well as to the individual set of priors being contained within the range of individual beliefs. However, when the ex post individual welfare is favored, the same Pareto-type condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility taking the form of a MaxMinMin social welfare function, as well as to the social set of priors containing only weighted averages of individual beliefs

On Multiple Discount Rates

We study the problem of resolving conflicting discount rates via a social choice approach. We introduce several axioms, seeking to capture the tension between allowing for intergenerational comparisons of utility, and imposing intergenerational fairness. Depending on which axioms are judged appropriate, we are led to one of several conclusions: a utilitarian, maxmin, or a multi‐utilitarian rule, whereby a utility stream is judged by the worst in a set of utilitarian weighting schemes across discount rates

Economic and Political Determinants of Budget Deficits in the European Union: A Dynamic Random Coefficient Approach

This paper formulates a dynamic Random Coefficient Model (RCM) to consider a set of popular determinants of public deficits in the EU-15 over the period 1971-2006, both at a country-specific level and from a population-wide perspective. Although the extent of government deficits and debt has been one of the most debated macroeconomic issues in recent times, the models trying to capture the explanatory powers driving these deficits typically estimate models that pose the strict assumption of homogeneity on the coefficients over all countries in the model. The sensibility of this assumption will be investigated, with results showing that an increase in the degree of heterogeneity leads to an improvement in the model fit and provides additional information to nuance the effects of the explanatory variables. In this way, the paper exposes a limited degree of partisanship over all countries under consideration, but on the other hand provides evidence for opportunistic behaviour of policymakers in the major part of the sample. The effect of institutional changes following the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty varies over the countries and is related to the necessity of budgetary consolidation.fiscal policy, European Monetary Union, Random Coefficient Model, Bayesian Analysis

Robust Rational Turnout

We establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, all equilibria of a class of complete information voting games (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)) are regular. Thus, all the equilibria of these games (including those exhibiting high turnout rates) are robust to small but arbitrary payoff perturbations, and survive in nearby games with incomplete information about voting costs and/or about the fraction of supporters of the two candidates. We also show that all the equilibria of these complete information games exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior, so that the strategies of indifferent players are characterized by at most two probabilities.Turnout, Regular Equilibrium.

Robust Rational Turnout

We establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, all equilibria of a class of complete information voting games (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)) are regular. Thus, all the equilibria of these games (including those exhibiting high turnout rates) are robust to small but arbitrary payoff perturbations, and survive in nearby games with incomplete information about voting costs and/or about the fraction of supporters of the two candidates. We also show that all the equilibria of these complete information games exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior, so that the strategies of indifferent players are characterized by at most two probabilities.Turnout, Regular Equilibrium.