1,964 research outputs found
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems
This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.#
Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: Applications
This paper studies the properties of endogenous information structures in some classes of Bayesian games in which a first stage of strategic information revelation is added. Sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized. In particular, the existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium is demonstrated for linear Bayesian games with an ordered information structure. Those games include, for example, Cournot games with incomplete information about the cost or the demand of industry, when firms may face any level of higher-order uncertainty. Several examples and different economic applications are examined to illustrate other results presented in the paper.Strategic information revelation; Bayesian games; Endogenous information structure; Certifiability.
State Information in Bayesian Games
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value
of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent
on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players,
the resulting value of the game has been analyzed under the framework of
Bayesian games. This investigation considers the optimal performance in a game
when a helper is transmitting state information to one of the players.
Encoding information for an adversarial setting (game) requires a different
result than rate-distortion theory provides. Game theory has accentuated the
importance of randomization (mixed strategy), which does not find a significant
role in most communication modems and source coding codecs. Higher rates of
communication, used in the right way, allow the message to include the
necessary random component useful in games.Comment: Presented at Allerton 2009, 6 pages, 5 eps figures, uses IEEEtran.cl
Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory.
game theory; Bayesian games;
Social optimality in quantum Bayesian games
A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of
the game-theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the
quantization of a game. Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash
equilibria. A refinement on the set of Pareto optimal outcomes is known as
social optimality in which the sum of players' payoffs are maximized. This
paper analyzes social optimality in a Bayesian game that uses the setting of
generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments for its physical
implementation. We show that for the quantum Bayesian game a direct connection
appears between the violation of Bell's inequality and the social optimal
outcome of the game and that it attains a superior socially optimal outcome.Comment: 12 pages, revise
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