Dominant bidding strategy in Mobile App advertising auction

The widespread use of intelligent mobile phone has promoted prosperity of mobile App advertising in recent years. Based on existing bidding status, this paper presents the dominant bidding strategy for mobile advertising auction. Firstly, our study characterizes multiple Nash Equilibria resulting from different bidding strategies in wGSP (weighted Generalized Second-Price) auction. Further more, we prove that advertiser’s rank and utility will not decrease by using the dominant bidding strategy. We also consider the situation where the reserve price is set by the mobile advertising platform. It turns out that that advertiser’s payment will be no less than reserve price. Finally, a practical implementation for a virtual market simulates the dynamic bidding process in real world environments.published_or_final_versio

Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions

Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized first-price mechanism with multi-dimensional bids turns out to be the only standard mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are one-dimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides an intuitive explanation for why first-price payments may be able to support equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than second-price payments

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design

A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct revelation-mechanisms. In practice, however, many mechanism use a restricted message space. This motivates the study of the tradeoffs involved in choosing simplified mechanisms, which can sometimes bring benefits in precluding bad or promoting good equilibria, and other times impose costs on welfare and revenue. We study the simplicity-expressiveness tradeoff in two representative settings, sponsored search auctions and combinatorial auctions, each being a canonical example for complete information and incomplete information analysis, respectively. We observe that the amount of information available to the agents plays an important role for the tradeoff between simplicity and expressiveness

Expressiveness And Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions

Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized first-price mechanism with multi-dimensional bids turns out to be the only standard mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are one-dimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides an intuitive explanation for why first-price payments may be able to support equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than second-price payments.Engineering and Applied Science