Sociobiology, universal Darwinism and their transcendence: An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism, and their types of reductionism towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism

Based on a review of different Darwinian paradigms, particularly sociobiology, this work, both, historically and philosophically, develops a metaphysic of gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, and then criticises and transcends these Darwinian paradigms in order to achieve a truly evolutionary theory of evolution. Part I introduces essential aspects of current sociobiology as the original challenge to this investigation. The claim of some sociobiologists that ethics should become biologized in a gene-egoistic way, is shown to be tied to certain biological views, which ethically lead to problematic results. In part II a historical investigation into sociobiology and Darwinism in general provides us, as historical epistemology', with a deeper understanding of the structure and background of these approaches. Gene-Darwinism, which presently dominates sociobiology and is linked to Dawkins' selfish gene view of evolution, is compared to Darwin's Darwinism and the evolutionary' synthesis and becomes defined more strictly. An account of the external history of Darwinism and its subparadigms shows how cultural intellectual presuppositions, like Malthusianism or the Newtonian concept of the unchangeable laws of nature, also influenced biological theory' construction. In part III universal 'process-Darwinism' is elaborated based on the historical interaction of Darwinism with non-biological subject areas. Building blocks for this are found in psychology, the theory of science and economics. Additionally, a metaphysical argument for the universality of process- Darwinism, linked to Hume's and Popper's problem of induction, is proposed. In part IV gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are criticised. Gene-Darwinism—despite its merits—is challenged as being one-sided in advocating 'gene-atomism', 'germ-line reductionism' and 'process-monism'. My alternative proposals develop and try to unify different criticisms often found. In respect of gene-atomism I advocate a many-level approach, opposing the necessary radical selfishness of single genes. I develop the concept of higher-level genes, propose a concept of systemic selection, which may stabilise group properties, without relying on permanent group selection and extend the applicability of a certain group selectionist model generally to small open groups. Proposals of mine linked to the critique of germ-line reductionism are: 'exformation', phenotypes as evolutionary factors and a field theoretic understanding of causa formalis (resembling Aristotelian hylemorphism). Finally the process-monism of gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, if defined strictly, Darwinism in general is criticised. 1 argue that our ontology and ethics would be improved by replacing the Newtoman-Paleyian deist metaphor of an eternal and unchangeable law of nature, which lies at tire very heart of Darwinism, by a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution where new processes may gain a certain autonomy. All this results in a view that I call 'ecological idealism', which, although still very much based on Darwinism, clearly transcends a Darwinian world view

Simultaneous torsion in the Legendre family

We improve a result due to Masser and Zannier, who showed that the set $$\{\lambda \in {\mathbb C} \setminus \{0,1\} : (2,\sqrt{2(2-\lambda)}), (3,\sqrt{6(3-\lambda)}) \in (E_\lambda)_{\text{tors}}\}$$ is finite, where $E_\lambda \colon y^2 = x(x-1)(x-\lambda)$ is the Legendre family of elliptic curves. More generally, denote by $T(\alpha, \beta)$, for $\alpha, \beta \in {\mathbb C} \setminus \{0,1\}$, $\alpha \neq \beta$, the set of $\lambda \in {\mathbb C} \setminus \{0,1\}$ such that all points with $x$-coordinate $\alpha$ or $\beta$ are torsion on $E_\lambda$. By further results of Masser and Zannier, all these sets are finite. We present a fairly elementary argument showing that the set $T(2,3)$ in question is actually empty. More generally, we obtain an explicit description of the set of parameters $\lambda$ such that the points with $x$-coordinate $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are simultaneously torsion, in the case that $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are algebraic numbers that not 2-adically close. We also improve another result due to Masser and Zannier dealing with the case that ${\mathbb Q}(\alpha, \beta)$ has transcendence degree 1. In this case we show that $\#T(\alpha, \beta) \le 1$ and that we can decide whether the set is empty or not, if we know the irreducible polynomial relating $\alpha$ and $\beta$. This leads to a more precise description of $T(\alpha, \beta)$ also in the case when both $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are algebraic. We performed extensive computations that support several conjectures, for example that there should be only finitely many pairs $(\alpha, \beta)$ such that $\#T(\alpha, \beta) \ge 3$.Comment: 24 pages. v2: Improved 2-adic results, leading to more cases that can be treated explicitly. Used this to solve a problem considered in arXiv:1509.06573. Added some reference

Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self

The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one’s own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers’ evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism

ALL OR NOTHING? NATURE IN CHINESE THOUGHT AND THE APOPHATIC OCCIDENT

This paper develops an interpretation of nature in classical Chinese culture through dialogue with the work of François Jullien. I understand nature negatively as precisely what never appears as such nor ever can be exactly apprehended and defined. For perception and expression entail inevitably human mediation and cultural transmission by semiotic and hermeneutic means that distort and occult the natural in the full depth of its alterity. My claim is that the largely negative approach to nature that Jullien finds in sources of Chinese tradition can also be found in the West, particularly in its apophatic currents or countercurrents that contest all along the more powerful positive conceptions and systems for construing and mastering the natural world. These insights grow especially from the critique of idolatry, in which worship of nature, in concrete, objective forms taken as gods, is negated. Bringing out this negative-theological matrix can give us a perspective on Jullien’s treatment and expose some of his own biases notably in favor of immanence to the exclusion of metaphysical transcendence. Comparative philosophy serves in this negative-theological key self-critically to identify blind spots in one’s own culture