Managing financing risk in capacity investment under green supply chain competition

In this paper, we study the asymmetric duopoly models of competing supply chains with financing uncertainty. The financing uncertainty of the green supply chain’s capacity investment could be available as complete or incomplete information to the traditional supply chain. By analyzing and comparing the optimal quantities, optimal prices, and optimal profits of both cases, we find that the financing uncertainty of capacity investment does not affect either chain’s choices of equilibrium quantities and prices in the complete information case. If this information is incomplete for the traditional supply chain, financing uncertainty plays an important role in determining optimal quantities and optimal prices, together with the lending interest rate. To encourage the use of environmentally friendly technologies, government should use per-unit subsidies if the green supply chain suffers the cost disadvantage, and should encourage financial institutions to provide preferential loans to the green supply chain that suffers manufacturing or retailing capacity restrictions

Equilibrium Analysis of Channel Structure Strategies in Uncertain Environment

Abstract In this paper, we consider a pricing decision problem with two competing supply chains which distribute differentiated but competing products in the same market. Each chain can be vertically integrated or decentralized based on the choice of the manufacturer. The manufacturing costs, sales costs and consumer demands are characterized as uncertain variables, whose distributions are estimated by experienced experts. Meanwhile, uncertainty theory and game theory are employed to formulate the pricing decision problems. The equilibrium behaviors (how the supply chain members make their own pricing decisions on wholesale prices and retailer markups) at operational level under three possible scenarios are derived. Numerical experiments are also given to explore the impacts of the parameters’ uncertain degrees on supply chain members’ pricing decisions. The results demonstrate that the supply chain uncertain factors have great influences on equilibrium prices. In addition, we also evaluate the effects of competing intensity (substitutability) of the two products on the strategy behaviors, vertically integrated channel strategy versus decentralized strategy, of the manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturers are better off to distribute their products through a decentralized channel rather than an integrated one when the substitutability is greater than some value. Besides, the uncertain factors in the supply chain might reduce the value contrast to the one in deterministic case. Some other interesting managerial highlights are also provided in this paper

Interactions of Bargaining Power and Introduction of Online Channel in Two Competing Supply Chains

This paper studies the effect of dual-channel format on supply chain’s competition ability and the effect of different bargaining powers on the competition between two supply chains and the optimal pricing decisions of all supply chain members when one supply chain introduces an online retailing channel. We develop four game models and obtain the optimal pricing decisions in closed form of these models and give some sensitivity analysis through numerical approach. Some new managerial insights are obtained as follows: Regardless of the two supply chain members’ bargaining forms, the optimal price, the maximal demand, and the maximal profit decrease as the self-price sensitivity decreases. The industry holds advantage in getting higher profit when the supply chain without online retailing channel is led by the retailer. In addition, we find that a manufacturer as a leader of its supply chain can get more profit when the competing supply chain’s leader is the manufacturer than when the competing supply chain’s leader is the retailer

Contracting for Competitive Supply Chains under Network Externalities and Demand Uncertainty

Based on network externalities and demand uncertainty environment, supply chain competition model is built; we identify the valid mechanism for the alternative range of profit-sharing contracts and also analyze the effect of product substitutability coefficient and network externalities on the alliance and profit-sharing contract. The results show that the vertical alliance contributes profit improvement to both the manufacturer and the retailer when the impact of network externalities on the product substitutability is not strong. However, vertical alliance will be out of operation when the effect of network externalities on the product substitutability is strong

Online Cooperative Promotion and Cost Sharing Policy under Supply Chain Competition

This paper studies online cooperative promotion and cost sharing decisions in competing supply chains. We consider a model of one B2C e-commerce platform and two supply chains each consisting of a supplier and an online retailer. The problem is studied using a multistage game. Firstly, the e-commerce platform carries out the cooperative promotion and sets the magnitude of markdown (the value of e-coupon). Secondly, each retailer and his supplier determine the fraction of promotional cost sharing when they have different bargaining power. Lastly, the retailers decide whether to participate in the cooperative promotion campaign. We show that the retailers are likely to participate in the promotion if consumers become more price-sensitive. However, it does not imply that the retailers can benefit from the price promotion; the promotion decision game resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game. The retailers and suppliers can benefit from the cooperative promotion by designing an appropriate cost sharing contract. For a supply chain, the bargaining power between supplier and retailer, consumer price sensitivity, and competition intensity affect the fraction of the promotional cost sharing. We also find that equilibrium value of e-coupon set by the e-commerce platform is not optimal for all the parties

An Investigation into Factors Affecting the Chilled Food Industry

With the advent of Industry 4.0, many new approaches towards process monitoring, benchmarking and traceability are becoming available, and these techniques have the potential to radically transform the agri-food sector. In particular, the chilled food supply chain (CFSC) contains a number of unique challenges by virtue of it being thought of as a temperature controlled supply chain. Therefore, once the key issues affecting the CFSC have been identified, algorithms can be proposed, which would allow realistic thresholds to be established for managing these problems on the micro, meso and macro scales. Hence, a study is required into factors affecting the CFSC within the scope of Industry 4.0. The study itself has been broken down into four main topics: identifying the key issues within the CFSC; implementing a philosophy of continuous improvement within the CFSC; identifying uncertainty within the CFSC; improving and measuring the performance of the supply chain. However, as a consequence of this study two further topics were added: a discussion of some of the issues surrounding information sharing between retailers and suppliers; some of the wider issues affecting food losses and wastage (FLW) on the micro, meso and macro scales. A hybrid algorithm is developed, which incorporates the analytic hierarchical process (AHP) for qualitative issues and data envelopment analysis (DEA) for quantitative issues. The hybrid algorithm itself is a development of the internal auditing algorithm proposed by Sueyoshi et al (2009), which in turn was developed following corporate scandals such as Tyco, Enron, and WorldCom, which have led to a decline in public trust. However, the advantage of the proposed solution is that all of the key issues within the CFSC identified can be managed from a single computer terminal, whilst the risk of food contamination such as the 2013 horsemeat scandal can be avoided via improved traceability