Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all of these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity or other resource allocation regions on the other.Comment: 12 pages, published at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/2008/318704 in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on "Theory and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications", April 200

A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links

Sustainability in a Multiproduct and Multiple Agent Contestable Market.

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged possibilities to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, threshold in the consumption and regularity of the profit function.Subsidy Free Princing; Existence Result; Cooperative game; Sustainability; Natural monopoly;

Automatic Prediction Of Small Group Performance In Information Sharing Tasks

In this paper, we describe a novel approach, based on Markov jump processes, to model small group conversational dynamics and to predict small group performance. More precisely, we estimate conversational events such as turn taking, backchannels, turn-transitions at the micro-level (1 minute windows) and then we bridge the micro-level behavior and the macro-level performance. We tested our approach with a cooperative task, the Information Sharing task, and we verified the relevance of micro- level interaction dynamics in determining a good group performance (e.g. higher speaking turns rate and more balanced participation among group members).Comment: Presented at Collective Intelligence conference, 2012 (arXiv:1204.2991