5 research outputs found
Algorithmic Security is Insufficient: A Comprehensive Survey on Implementation Attacks Haunting Post-Quantum Security
This survey is on forward-looking, emerging security concerns in post-quantum
era, i.e., the implementation attacks for 2022 winners of NIST post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) competition and thus the visions, insights, and discussions
can be used as a step forward towards scrutinizing the new standards for
applications ranging from Metaverse, Web 3.0 to deeply-embedded systems. The
rapid advances in quantum computing have brought immense opportunities for
scientific discovery and technological progress; however, it poses a major risk
to today's security since advanced quantum computers are believed to break all
traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms. This has led to active
research on PQC algorithms that are believed to be secure against classical and
powerful quantum computers. However, algorithmic security is unfortunately
insufficient, and many cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks (SCA), where an attacker passively or actively gets side-channel data
to compromise the security properties that are assumed to be safe
theoretically. In this survey, we explore such imminent threats and their
countermeasures with respect to PQC. We provide the respective, latest
advancements in PQC research, as well as assessments and providing visions on
the different types of SCAs
Efficient ASIC Architectures for Low Latency Niederreiter Decryption
Post-quantum cryptography addresses the increasing threat that quantum computing poses to modern communication systems. Among the available quantum-resistant systems, the Niederreiter cryptosystem is positioned as a conservative choice with strong security guarantees. As a code-based cryptosystem, the Niederreiter system enables high performance operations and is thus ideally suited for applications such as the acceleration of server workloads. However, until now, no ASIC architecture is available for low latency computation of Niederreiter operations. Therefore, the present work targets the design, implementation and optimization of tailored archi- tectures for low latency Niederreiter decryption. Two architectures utilizing different decoding algorithms are proposed and implemented using a 22nm FDSOI CMOS technology node. One of these optimized architectures improves the decryption latency by 27% compared to a state-of-the-art reference and requires at the same time only 25% of the area
A survey of timing channels and countermeasures
A timing channel is a communication channel that can transfer information to a receiver/decoder by modulating the timing behavior of an entity. Examples of this entity include the interpacket delays of a packet stream, the reordering packets in a packet stream, or the resource access time of a cryptographic module. Advances in the information and coding theory and the availability of high-performance computing systems interconnected by high-speed networks have spurred interest in and development of various types of timing channels. With the emergence of complex timing channels, novel detection and prevention techniques are also being developed to counter them. In this article, we provide a detailed survey of timing channels broadly categorized into network timing channel, in which communicating entities are connected by a network, and in-system timing channel, in which the communicating entities are within a computing system. This survey builds on the last comprehensive survey by Zander et al. [2007] and considers all three canonical applications of timing channels, namely, covert communication, timing side channel, and network flow watermarking. We survey the theoretical foundations, the implementation, and the various detection and prevention techniques that have been reported in literature. Based on the analysis of the current literature, we discuss potential future research directions both in the design and application of timing channels and their detection and prevention techniques
BLAKE-512-Based 128-Bit CCA2 Secure Timing Attack Resistant McEliece Cryptoprocessor
This paper presents a 128-bit CCA2-secure McEliece cryptoprocessor. The existing side-channel vulnerabilities in this regard are also taken care during the implementation of such a post-quantum immune code-based cryptosystem. In order to achieve CCA2 security on original McEliece algorithm, we incorporate a SHA-3 finalist, BLAKE-512 module into the architecture. A complete binary-XGCD algorithm for Goppa field is introduced. The final design on a Virtex-6 FPGA performs an encryption in 4.74 μs and a decryption in 0.92 ms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first hardware design of McEliece with the above mentioned advanced security features which is also resistant against existing timing attacks. © 2012 IEEE.status: publishe