Preference-Dependent Unawareness

Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.Unawareness, awareness, knowledge, preferences, subjective expected utility theory, decision theory, null event

Preference-Based Unawareness

Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.unawareness, awareness, knowledge, preferences, subjective expected utility theory, decision theory, null event

Forgetting agent awareness: a partial semantics approach

International audiencePartial Dynamic Epistemic Logic allows agents to have different knowledge representations about the world through agent awareness. Agents use their own vocabularies to reason and talk about the world and raise their awareness when confronted with new vocabulary. Through raising awareness the vocabularies of agents are extended, suggesting there is a dual, inverse operator for forgetting awareness that decreases vocabularies. In this paper, we discuss such an operator. Unlike raising awareness, this operator may induce an abstraction on models that removes evidence while preserving conclusions. This is useful to better understand how agents with different knowledge representations communicate with each other, as they may forget the justifications that led them to their conclusions

Agent-update Models

In dynamic epistemic logic (Van Ditmarsch et al., 2008) it is customary to use an action frame (Baltag and Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998) to describe different views of a single action. In this article, action frames are extended to add or remove agents, we call these agent-update frames. This can be done selectively so that only some specified agents get information of the update, which can be used to model several interesting examples such as private update and deception, studied earlier by Baltag and Moss (2004); Sakama (2015); Van Ditmarsch et al. (2012). The product update of a Kripke model by an action frame is an abbreviated way of describing the transformed Kripke model which is the result of performing the action. This is substantially extended to a sum-product update of a Kripke model by an agent-update frame in the new setting. These ideas are applied to an AI problem of modelling a story. We show that dynamic epistemic logics, with update modalities now based on agent-update frames, continue to have sound and complete proof systems. Decision procedures for model checking and satisfiability have expected complexity. A sublanguage is shown to have polynomial space algorithms

Informe bibliográfico sobre la lógica (epistémica) de la conciencia

Awareness Logic is an extension of epistemic logic that solves the problem of logical omniscience by incorporating an awareness operator that separates the explicit knowledge from the implicit one. This report collects the most prominent works regarding the beginnings of this logic, as well as its developments in the past three decades. Specifically, it reviews the approaches from Dynamic Epistemic Logic, from the ones that combine other logics with Awareness Logic and those from Game Theory.La lógica de la conciencia es una extensión de la lógica epistémica que solventa el problema de la omnisciencia lógica incorporando un operador de conciencia para separar el conocimiento explícito del implícito. Este informe recopila los principales textos tanto de los orígenes de esta lógica, así como de sus desarrollos en las últimas tres décadas. En concreto analiza los enfoques desde la lógica epistémica dinámica, desde su combinación con otras lógicas y los enfoques de teoría de juegos

Preference-Based Unawareness

Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null