The Tellico Project on the Little Tennessee River.

Report prepared by the Tennessee Valley Authority describing the proposed Tellico Project. The report includes numerous maps of the affected areas

An application of high authority/low authority control and positivity

Control Dynamics Company (CDy), in conjunction with NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), has supported the U.S. Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratory (AFWAL) in conducting an investigation of the implementation of several DOD controls techniques. These techniques are to provide vibration suppression and precise attitude control for flexible space structures. AFWAL issued a contract to Control Dynamics to perform this work under the Active Control Technique Evaluation for Spacecraft (ACES) Program. The High Authority Control/Low Authority Control (HAC/LAC) and Positivity controls techniques, which were cultivated under the DARPA Active Control of Space Structures (ACOSS) Program, were applied to a structural model of the NASA/MSFC Ground Test Facility ACES configuration. The control systems design were accomplished and linear post-analyses of the closed-loop systems are provided. The control system designs take into account effects of sampling and delay in the control computer. Nonlinear simulation runs were used to verify the control system designs and implementations in the facility control computers. Finally, test results are given to verify operations of the control systems in the test facility

Standard formatted data units-control authority procedures

The purpose of this document is to establish a set of minimum and optional requirements for the implementation of Control Authority (CA) organizations within and among the Agencies participating in the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS). By satisfying these requirements, the resultant cooperating set of CA organizations will produce a global CA service supporting information transfer with digital data under the Standard Formatted Data Unit (SFDU) concept. This service is primarily accomplished through the registration, permanent archiving, and dissemination of metadata in the form of Metadata Objects (MDO) that assist in the interpretation of data objects received in SFDU form. This Recommendation addresses the responsibilities, services, and interface protocols for a hierarchy of CA organizations. The top level, consisting of the CCSDS Secretariat and its operational agent, is unique and primarily provides a global coordination function. The lower levels are Agency CA organizations that have primary responsibility for the registration, archiving, and dissemination of MDOs. As experience is gained and technology evolves, the CA Procedures will be extended to include enhanced services and their supporting protocols. In particular, it is anticipated that eventually CA organizations will be linked via networks on a global basis, and will provide requestors with online automated access to CA services. While this Recommendation does not preclude such operations, it also does not recommend the specific protocols to be used to ensure global compatibility of these services. These recommendations will be generated as experience is gained

Transferable Control

In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control

Analysis of N-qubit Perfect Controlled Teleportation Schemes from the Controller\u27s Point of View

We quantitatively analyze and evaluate the controller\u27s power in N-qubit controlled teleportation schemes. We calculate the minimum control power required to ensure the controller\u27s authority such that the teleportation fidelity without the controller\u27s permission is no more than the classical bound. We revisit several typical controlled teleportation schemes from the controller\u27s point of view and evaluate the control power in these schemes. We find that for teleporting arbitrary N-qubit states, each controller should control at least N bits of useful information to ensure his or her authority over the protocol. We also discuss the general rules that must be satisfied by controlled teleportation schemes to ensure both teleportation fidelity and control power

Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization’s stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization’s decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions

Looking for a Better Way: the Sanction Laws of Key U.S. Allies

When it comes to imposing economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes, the Chief Executives of the United Kingdom, West Germany, andJapan have broad authority to control their respective countries\u27 exports, imports, and private financial transactions. This authority differs from that of the U.S. President who, under present U.S. law, has wide discretion to cut off almost all exports, but has only limited control over imports and over foreign loans by private U.S. banks. This is in the absence of a declared national emergency, where the President has sweeping powers

CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.Environmental Economics and Policy,

The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions

Fast pace of change in the business of technology is the reality of many organizations today. The software development industry is one example where this nature is prominent. Companies need to adapt in ways that eases the persistence against change from external forces. Companies need to turn into Learning Organizations as these help people and organizations embrace change. Two key components of the Learning Organization are the teams, as they are considered to be the fundamental units of organizations, and managers, as they have the biggest impact on facilitating learning in the organization. Therefore, this study has investigated how managers could act to create conditions for encouraging team learning of a software development company to become a Learning Organization.   This has been done by conducting a case study at the company Ericsson in Kista, Sweden, who is market leaders within the software development industry. The case design consisted of a two phase method that included both a quantitative and qualitative data collection method.   The results indicate that Ericsson could be classified as a Learning Organization and in addition display promising characteristics when it comes to having team learning capabilities. Furthermore, the findings suggest that in order for managers to encourage team learning they should take on a coaching and supporting role to understand the need of the teams; challenge the status quo; empower teams through giving them mandate; allocate time for learning as an integral part of the daily work; and reward learning in teams.   The findings of this study have implications both in a theoretical aspect and a sustainability aspect. From the theoretical aspect, the findings provide with further empirical data in a field that is currently dominated by theoretical literature. Furthermore, the findings display a practical example of how managers of a market leading company with promising characteristics of team learning capabilities have acted to create such conditions. From a sustainability aspect, the results of this study give firms a sustainable competitive advantage through increased business performance, healthy labor conditions that are a result of healthy team dynamics and possible encouragement to future attention towards emphasis on environmental aspects