Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio

Options for Securing RTP Sessions

The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of different application domains and environments. This heterogeneity implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide services such as confidentiality, integrity, and source authentication of RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets suitable for the various environments. The range of solutions makes it difficult for RTP-based application developers to pick the most suitable mechanism. This document provides an overview of a number of security solutions for RTP and gives guidance for developers on how to choose the appropriate security mechanism

A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in the research community due their wide range of applications. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios. Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. This paper discusses the current state of the art in security mechanisms for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and their countermeasures presented. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, 2 table

Delivering Live Multimedia Streams to Mobile Hosts in a Wireless Internet with Multiple Content Aggregators

We consider the distribution of channels of live multimedia content (e.g., radio or TV broadcasts) via multiple content aggregators. In our work, an aggregator receives channels from content sources and redistributes them to a potentially large number of mobile hosts. Each aggregator can offer a channel in various configurations to cater for different wireless links, mobile hosts, and user preferences. As a result, a mobile host can generally choose from different configurations of the same channel offered by multiple alternative aggregators, which may be available through different interfaces (e.g., in a hotspot). A mobile host may need to handoff to another aggregator once it receives a channel. To prevent service disruption, a mobile host may for instance need to handoff to another aggregator when it leaves the subnets that make up its current aggregator�s service area (e.g., a hotspot or a cellular network).\ud In this paper, we present the design of a system that enables (multi-homed) mobile hosts to seamlessly handoff from one aggregator to another so that they can continue to receive a channel wherever they go. We concentrate on handoffs between aggregators as a result of a mobile host crossing a subnet boundary. As part of the system, we discuss a lightweight application-level protocol that enables mobile hosts to select the aggregator that provides the �best� configuration of a channel. The protocol comes into play when a mobile host begins to receive a channel and when it crosses a subnet boundary while receiving the channel. We show how our protocol can be implemented using the standard IETF session control and description protocols SIP and SDP. The implementation combines SIP and SDP�s offer-answer model in a novel way

Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions

Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public /private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). Within this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model

Authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange: theory and practice

Authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals A and B, communicating over a public network, and each holding a pair of matching public/private keys to agree on a session key. Protocols designed to deal with this problem ensure A (B resp.)that no other principals aside from B (A resp.) can learn any information about this value. These protocols additionally often ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed the shared secret value. A natural extension to the above cryptographic protocol problem is to consider a pool of principals agreeing on a session key. Over the years several papers have extended the two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange to the multi-party setting but no formal treatments were carried out till recently. In light of recent developments in the formalization of the authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange we have in this thesis laid out the authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange on firmer foundations

Authenticated Key Agreement in Dynamic Groups

Multicast security poses interesting challenges in the area of key management. Designing a good protocol for key agreement in dynamic multicast groups involves a thorough understanding of the trade-offs that exist among storage, communication and computation overhead. The contribution of this thesis is a verifiable protocol for authenticated key agreement based on a distributed key generation scheme. The underlying key generation scheme has shown promise in being natural for collaborative group applications. The protocol can then be tailored to particular applications once we understand the communication, storage and computation constraints specific to the application. To handle group membership changes in dynamic groups, an auxiliary key agreement protocol is introduced. The auxiliary protocol re-uses contributions to the key in the previous round, to form the new key. The key shares of the members contributing fresh values in the current round are more susceptible to discovery by colluding group members (not outsiders). The auxiliary protocol does not introduce any other security weakness. A protocol that starts from the scratch on membership change is going to be expensive, slow and unsuitable for most applications.We use the well-known Logical Key Tree (LKH) structure to allow the key management (distribution) part of the protocol to scale to large groups. The key tree structure helps to localize the effect of membership change and as a result, reduces the communication overhead to form the new session key