Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

Incentive compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources and its application to GeoPresence-as-a-Service

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen- ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent's exibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo- bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat- isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1 2 -approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent's truthfulness about its exibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments

Anchor-Assisted and Vote-Based Trustworthiness Assurance in Smart City Crowdsensing

Smart city sensing calls for crowdsensing via mobile devices that are equipped with various built-in sensors. As incentivizing users to participate in distributed sensing is still an open research issue, the trustworthiness of crowdsensed data is expected to be a grand challenge if this cloud-inspired recruitment of sensing services is to be adopted. Recent research proposes reputation-based user recruitment models for crowdsensing; however, there is no standard way of identifying adversaries in smart city crowdsensing. This paper adopts previously proposed vote-based approaches, and presents a thorough performance study of vote-based trustworthiness with trusted entities that are basically a subset of the participating smartphone users. Those entities are called trustworthy anchors of the crowdsensing system. Thus, an anchor user is fully trustworthy and is fully capable of voting for the trustworthiness of other users, who participate in sensing of the same set of phenomena. Besides the anchors, the reputations of regular users are determined based on vote-based (distributed) reputation. We present a detailed performance study of the anchor-based trustworthiness assurance in smart city crowdsensing through simulations, and compare it with the purely vote-based trustworthiness approach without anchors, and a reputation-unaware crowdsensing approach, where user reputations are discarded. Through simulation findings, we aim at providing specifications regarding the impact of anchor and adversary populations on crowdsensing and user utilities under various environmental settings. We show that significant improvement can be achieved in terms of usefulness and trustworthiness of the crowdsensed data if the size of the anchor population is set properl

Mechanisms for improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems

Given its potential for a large variety of real-life applications, smartphone crowdsensing has recently gained tremendous attention from the research community. Smartphone crowdsensing is a paradigm that allows ordinary citizens to participate in large-scale sensing surveys by using user-friendly applications installed in their smartphones. In this way, fine-grained sensing information is obtained from smartphone users without employing fixed and expensive infrastructure, and with negligible maintenance costs. Existing smartphone sensing systems depend completely on the participants\u27 willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information regarding the events being monitored. Therefore, it becomes paramount to scalably and effectively determine, enforce, and optimize the information quality of the sensing reports submitted by the participants. To this end, mechanisms to improve information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems were designed in this work. Firstly, the FIRST framework is presented, which is a reputation-based mechanism that leverages the concept of mobile trusted participants to determine and improve the information quality of collected data. Secondly, it is mathematically modeled and studied the problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful execution of sensing tasks when participants having uncertain mobility execute sensing tasks. Two incentive mechanisms based on game and auction theory are then proposed to efficiently and scalably solve such problem. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms developed in this thesis outperform existing state of the art in improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems --Abstract, page iii

Vehicle as a Service (VaaS): Leverage Vehicles to Build Service Networks and Capabilities for Smart Cities

Smart cities demand resources for rich immersive sensing, ubiquitous communications, powerful computing, large storage, and high intelligence (SCCSI) to support various kinds of applications, such as public safety, connected and autonomous driving, smart and connected health, and smart living. At the same time, it is widely recognized that vehicles such as autonomous cars, equipped with significantly powerful SCCSI capabilities, will become ubiquitous in future smart cities. By observing the convergence of these two trends, this article advocates the use of vehicles to build a cost-effective service network, called the Vehicle as a Service (VaaS) paradigm, where vehicles empowered with SCCSI capability form a web of mobile servers and communicators to provide SCCSI services in smart cities. Towards this direction, we first examine the potential use cases in smart cities and possible upgrades required for the transition from traditional vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) to VaaS. Then, we will introduce the system architecture of the VaaS paradigm and discuss how it can provide SCCSI services in future smart cities, respectively. At last, we identify the open problems of this paradigm and future research directions, including architectural design, service provisioning, incentive design, and security & privacy. We expect that this paper paves the way towards developing a cost-effective and sustainable approach for building smart cities.Comment: 32 pages, 11 figure

Interval Tree-Based Task Scheduling Method for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems

Nowadays there is an increasing demand to provide a real-time environmental information. So, the growing number of mobile devices carried by users establish a new and fastgrowing sensing paradigm to satisfy this need, which is called Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS). The MCS uses different sensing abilities to acquire local knowledge through enhanced mobile devices. In MCS, it is very important to collect high-quality sensory data that satisfies the needs of all assigned tasks and the task organizers with a minimum cost for the participants. One of the most important factors which affect the MCS cost is how to schedule different sensing tasks which must be assigned to a smartphone with the objective of minimizing sensing energy consumption while ensuring high-quality sensory data. In this paper, the problem of task scheduling the which have mutual sensor is formulated and a scheduling method to minimize the energy consumption by reducing the sensor utilization is proposed. The proposed method will incentive the users to participate in multiple tasks at the same time, which minimizes the total cost of the performed tasks and increases his rewards. The experimental results by using synthetic and real data show that the proposed scheduling method can minimize the energy consumption and preserve the task requirements compared to existing algorithms