Bayesian Updating, Model Class Selection and Robust Stochastic Predictions of Structural Response

A fundamental issue when predicting structural response by using mathematical models is how to treat both modeling and excitation uncertainty. A general framework for this is presented which uses probability as a multi-valued conditional logic for quantitative plausible reasoning in the presence of uncertainty due to incomplete information. The fundamental probability models that represent the structure’s uncertain behavior are specified by the choice of a stochastic system model class: a set of input-output probability models for the structure and a prior probability distribution over this set that quantifies the relative plausibility of each model. A model class can be constructed from a parameterized deterministic structural model by stochastic embedding utilizing Jaynes’ Principle of Maximum Information Entropy. Robust predictive analyses use the entire model class with the probabilistic predictions of each model being weighted by its prior probability, or if structural response data is available, by its posterior probability from Bayes’ Theorem for the model class. Additional robustness to modeling uncertainty comes from combining the robust predictions of each model class in a set of competing candidates weighted by the prior or posterior probability of the model class, the latter being computed from Bayes’ Theorem. This higherlevel application of Bayes’ Theorem automatically applies a quantitative Ockham razor that penalizes the data-fit of more complex model classes that extract more information from the data. Robust predictive analyses involve integrals over highdimensional spaces that usually must be evaluated numerically. Published applications have used Laplace's method of asymptotic approximation or Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms

Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence

Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also show that such sets converge to a shared, maximally informed opinion. Convergence to a maximally informed opinion is a (weak) Jeffrey conditioning analogue of Bayesian “convergence to the truth” for conditional probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate the philosophical significance of our study by detailing applications to the topics of dynamic coherence, imprecise probabilities, and probabilistic opinion pooling