Asymmetric Information, Investment Opportunity, Profitability, Dividend Dan Kebijakan Leverage Perusahaan Makanan Minuman

Pecking order theory is a theory that emphasizes the manager chooses to use retained earnings tofund the company rather than debt and the last alternative new shares issued. This study aims todetermine the influence of asymmetric information, investment opportunity, profitability and dividendon the company's leverage. Type of data used are secondary data which are reported in the company'sfinancial ratios during the study period in 2006-2009. Results showed that mean of the variableasymmetric information, investment opportunity, profitability and dividend influence simultaneouslyto the leverage of company. There is only asymmetric information which is partially significant toinfluence the company leverage

Quantum games of asymmetric information

We investigate quantum games in which the information is asymmetrically distributed among the players, and find the possibility of the quantum game outperforming its classical counterpart depends strongly on not only the entanglement, but also the informational asymmetry. What is more interesting, when the information distribution is asymmetric, the contradictive impact of the quantum entanglement on the profits is observed, which is not reported in quantum games of symmetric information.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figure

Licensing under Asymmetric information

In a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the result found on licensing under complete information. Further, we show that under incomplete information welfare could be higher than under complete information.Asymmetric information, Licensing, Welfare

Randomization with Asymmetric Information

It is by now well-known that, in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection, randomization of insurance premia and benefits may be Pareto efficient. This paper: i) provides a typology of the various forms that randomization may take; ii) derives necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the desirability of these various forms of randomization; iii) obtains some simple characterization theorems of the efficient random policies; iv) gives some intuition behind the results; and v) considers why randomization appears to occur less often in practice than the theory suggests it should.

Asymmetric Information and Market Collapse

In this paper, using data for the period January 1995 to May 2009 for the Shanghai stock exchange (SHSE), we show that aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor. We develop the relationship between the illiquidity factor, asymmetric information, and market collapse. Our empirical results show that while the illiquidity factor is a source of asymmetric information on the SHSE, asymmetric information does not trigger a market collapse.Illiquidity Factor; Asymmetric Information; Market Collapse.

Asymmetric information and market collapse: Evidence from the Chinese Market

In this paper, using data for the period January 1995 to May 2009 for the Shanghai stock exchange (SHSE), we show that aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor. We develop the relationship between the illiquidity factor, asymmetric information, and market collapse. Our empirical results show that while the illiquidity factor is a source of asymmetric information on the SHSE, asymmetric information does not trigger a market collapseIlliquidity Factor; Asymmetric Information; Market Collapse