P2_1 Assault and Battery

This paper aims to calculate how many degrees of counter-battery artillery fire are required before there is an equivalent explosive yield to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima being fired every minute. This value is found to decrease exponentially as the number of guns in each artillery battery increases, but remains so high that we suggest that tactical nuclear weapons have no practical application and are excessive in any battlefield scenarios

Into the Gray Zone: Examining Mutual Combat as a Defense to Domestic Assault

For offenses committed under Virginia’s assault and battery against a household or family member statute, the State should prosecute and punish in cases where both parties committed an assault and battery. Punishment, however, should consist of mainly individualized counseling or some other mitigated punishment for cases of mutual fighting

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE-POWER TO REDUCE GRADE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE IN ORDER TO AVOID JURY TRIAL

A complaint was made in the Municipal Court of Hoboken against the defendant charging that he had willfully committed an assault and battery by spitting on another, in violation of the Disorderly Persons Law, which states: Any person who commits an assault or an assault and battery is a disorderly person. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statute violated his constitutional right to prosecution by indictment and trial by jury. The municipal court denied the motion. On certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court, held, the statute did not wrongfully deny defendant a jury trial. The statute refers only to simple assault and battery, which was punishable summarily at common law. Summary proceedings under the Disorderly Persons Act, which has been in existence in some form since 1799 and which for many years has contained offenses indictable at common law and more serious than assault and battery, has been challenged only once and then unsuccessfully. This acquiescence is supported by analogy to the judicially accepted practice of summary jurisdiction under municipal ordinances. State v. Maier, (N.J. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 21

Assault and Battery on Property

Both criminal and tort law seek, in part, to respond to the harm inflicted on persons\u27 organic, human, continuous bodies, through hitting, offensive groping, rape, stabbing, gunshots, vehicular homicide, and more. But could there be such a thing as assault and battery on a person\u27s inorganic, non-human, discontinuous body? A battery on one\u27s prosthetic arm, on one\u27s wheelchair, on one\u27s cochlear implant? Even a battery on one\u27s iPhone or computer, which some users have provocatively begun to call an exobrain ? This Article investigates whether there is any use in employing metaphors such as exobrain, battery on a wheelchair, and the like. It first demonstrates that the metaphors are not entirely fanciful because the social, as opposed to pre-social, body is the body that matters, and the social body extends beyond organic, human, continuous material to inorganic, non-human, discontinuous entities. An assessment of the variables that lead one to decide whether an object is or is not part of the social body yields no clear-cut test. The Article then explores what is gained, and potentially lost, by calling an iPhone an exobrain, rather than merely a very important piece of property. The author concludes that this rhetoric holds the promise of helping us recognize and remedy underappreciated injuries, but that it also bears the risk of reifying a cramped conception of the body, and of what injuries count

Master and Servant-Assault and Battery

Recent Case Note

ASSAULT AND BATTERY - DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

In a suit brought to recover damages for the death of plaintiff\u27s husband the evidence indicated that the deceased, and other intruders, entered defendant\u27s place of business after having been ordered to leave. The group threw bricks and other missiles at Gennaro, destroying whiskey bottles and other property, whereupon Gennaro secured a pistol and shot and killed Wade. It was held that defendant was justified in killing the inebriated trespasser. Wade v. Gennaro, (La. App. 1942) 8 So. (2d) 561