A computational complexity approach to the definition of empirical equivalence.

I propose to investigate the problem of empirical equivalence by performing numerical calculations, simulating hypothetical physical systems, with known evolution rules, which include a robot performing an experiment. The aim of the experiments of the robot is to discover the rules governing the system in which it is simulated. The proposed numerical calculation is actually a thought experiment: I discuss the principles of how the discussion on the empirical equivalence should be performed; the discussion is based on the evaluation of the complexity classes of problems connected to the numerical calculation. Based on this discussion, I prove a sufficient condition for empirical equivalence, which is based on the existence of a transformation belonging to a given complexity class

A computational complexity approach to the definition of empirical equivalence.

I propose to investigate the problem of empirical equivalence by performing numerical calculations, simulating hypothetical physical systems, with known evolution rules, which include a robot performing an experiment. The aim of the experiments of the robot is to discover the rules governing the system in which it is simulated. The proposed numerical calculation is actually a thought experiment: I discuss the principles of how the discussion on the empirical equivalence should be performed; the discussion is based on the evaluation of the complexity classes of problems connected to the numerical calculation. Based on this discussion, I prove a sufficient condition for empirical equivalence, which is based on the existence of a transformation belonging to a given complexity class

Reconsidering Conventionalism: An Invitation to a Sophisticated Philosophy for Modern (Space-)Times

Geometric underdetermination (i.e., the underdetermination of the geometric properties of space and time) is a live possibility in light of some of our best theories of physics. In response to this, geometric conventionalism offers a selective anti-realism, refusing to assign truth values to variant geometric propositions. Although often regarded as being dead in the water by modern philosophers, in this article we propose to revitalise the programme of geometric conventionalism both on its own terms, and as an attractive response to the above-mentioned live cases of geometric underdetermination. Specifically, we (1) articulate geometrical conventionalism as we conceive it, (2) anticipate various objections to the view, and defend it against those objections, and (3) demonstrate how geometric conventionalism plays out in the context of a wide variety of spacetime theories, both classical and relativistic

Artificial Examples of Empirical Equivalence

In this paper I analyze three artificial examples of empirical equivalence: van Fraassen’s alternative formulations of Newton’s theory, the Poincaré-Reichenbach argument for the conventionality of geometry; and predictively equivalent ‘systems of the world’. These examples have received attention in the philosophy of science literature because they are supposed to illustrate the connection between predictive equivalence and underdetermination of theory choice. I conclude that this view is wrong. These examples of empirical equivalence are harmless with respect to the problem of underdetermination