7 research outputs found
Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions
This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for each of all the value distribution families studied in the literature: [0,1]-bounded, [1,H]-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR). Remarkably, the setting-specific tight sample complexity poly(?^{-1}) depends on the precision ? ? (0, 1), but not on the number of bidders n ? 1. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our learning algorithm allows correlated value distributions.
In contrast, the tight sample complexity ??(n) ? poly(?^{-1}) of Myerson Auction proved by Guo, Huang and Zhang (STOC 2019) has a nearly-linear dependence on n ? 1, and holds only for independent value distributions in every setting.
We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical arguments with a direct proof
Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions
This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with
Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for all value distribution
families that have been considered in the literature. Compared to Myerson
Auction, whose sample complexity was settled very recently in (Guo, Huang and
Zhang, STOC 2019), Anonymous Reserve requires much fewer samples for learning.
We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their
information theoretical argument with a direct proof
LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volume
LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volum
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Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation
We study two classes of problems within Algorithmic Economics: revenue guarantees of simple mechanisms, and social welfare guarantees of auctions. We develop new structural and algorithmic tools for addressing these problems, and obtain the following results:
In the -unit model, four canonical mechanisms can be classified as: (i) the discriminating group, including Myerson Auction and Sequential Posted-Pricing, and (ii) the anonymous group, including Anonymous Reserve and Anonymous Pricing. We prove that any two mechanisms from the same group have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of 1 + θ(1 /√), while any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of θ(log ).
In the single-item model, we prove a nearly-tight sample complexity of Anonymous Reserve for every value distribution family investigated in the literature: [0, 1]-bounded, [1, ]-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR).
Remarkably, the setting-specific sample complexity poly(⁻¹) depends on the precision ∈ (0, 1), but not on the number of bidders ≥ 1. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our algorithm allows correlated value distributions. These are in sharp contrast to the previous (nearly-tight) sample complexity results on Myerson Auction.
In the single-item model, we prove that the tight Price of Anarchy/Stability for First Price Auctions are both PoA = PoS = 1 - 1/² ≈ 0.8647