Superstrong and other large cardinals are never Laver indestructible

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, \Sigma_n-reflecting cardinals, \Sigma_n-correct cardinals and \Sigma_n-extendible cardinals (all for n>2) are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if \kappa\ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target \theta, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically <\kappa-closed forcing Q in V_\theta, the cardinal \kappa\ will exhibit none of the large cardinal properties with target \theta\ or larger.Comment: 19 pages. Commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/superstrong-never-indestructible. Minor changes in v

Set-Theoretic Geology

A ground of the universe V is a transitive proper class W subset V, such that W is a model of ZFC and V is obtained by set forcing over W, so that V = W[G] for some W-generic filter G subset P in W . The model V satisfies the ground axiom GA if there are no such W properly contained in V . The model W is a bedrock of V if W is a ground of V and satisfies the ground axiom. The mantle of V is the intersection of all grounds of V . The generic mantle of V is the intersection of all grounds of all set-forcing extensions of V . The generic HOD, written gHOD, is the intersection of all HODs of all set-forcing extensions. The generic HOD is always a model of ZFC, and the generic mantle is always a model of ZF. Every model of ZFC is the mantle and generic mantle of another model of ZFC. We prove this theorem while also controlling the HOD of the final model, as well as the generic HOD. Iteratively taking the mantle penetrates down through the inner mantles to what we call the outer core, what remains when all outer layers of forcing have been stripped away. Many fundamental questions remain open.Comment: 44 pages; commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoreticgeology

Open questions about Ramsey-type statements in reverse mathematics

Ramsey's theorem states that for any coloring of the n-element subsets of N with finitely many colors, there is an infinite set H such that all n-element subsets of H have the same color. The strength of consequences of Ramsey's theorem has been extensively studied in reverse mathematics and under various reducibilities, namely, computable reducibility and uniform reducibility. Our understanding of the combinatorics of Ramsey's theorem and its consequences has been greatly improved over the past decades. In this paper, we state some questions which naturally arose during this study. The inability to answer those questions reveals some gaps in our understanding of the combinatorics of Ramsey's theorem.Comment: 15 page

The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality principles

We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and L\"owe, including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all larger $V_\beta$); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger $V_\kappa$ for inaccessible cardinals $\kappa$); transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.Comment: 36 pages. Commentary can be made about this article at http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism. Minor revisions in v2; further minor revisions in v

Indeterminateness and `The' Universe of Sets: Multiversism, Potentialism, and Pluralism

In this article, I survey some philosophical attitudes to talk concerning `the' universe of sets. I separate out four different strands of the debate, namely: (i) Universism, (ii) Multiversism, (iii) Potentialism, and (iv) Pluralism. I discuss standard arguments and counterarguments concerning the positions and some of the natural mathematical programmes that are suggested by the various views

On what I do not understand (and have something to say): Part I

This is a non-standard paper, containing some problems in set theory I have in various degrees been interested in. Sometimes with a discussion on what I have to say; sometimes, of what makes them interesting to me, sometimes the problems are presented with a discussion of how I have tried to solve them, and sometimes with failed tries, anecdote and opinion. So the discussion is quite personal, in other words, egocentric and somewhat accidental. As we discuss many problems, history and side references are erratic, usually kept at a minimum (``see ... '' means: see the references there and possibly the paper itself). The base were lectures in Rutgers Fall'97 and reflect my knowledge then. The other half, concentrating on model theory, will subsequently appear

The weakness of being cohesive, thin or free in reverse mathematics

Informally, a mathematical statement is robust if its strength is left unchanged under variations of the statement. In this paper, we investigate the lack of robustness of Ramsey's theorem and its consequence under the frameworks of reverse mathematics and computable reducibility. To this end, we study the degrees of unsolvability of cohesive sets for different uniformly computable sequence of sets and identify different layers of unsolvability. This analysis enables us to answer some questions of Wang about how typical sets help computing cohesive sets. We also study the impact of the number of colors in the computable reducibility between coloring statements. In particular, we strengthen the proof by Dzhafarov that cohesiveness does not strongly reduce to stable Ramsey's theorem for pairs, revealing the combinatorial nature of this non-reducibility and prove that whenever $k$ is greater than $\ell$, stable Ramsey's theorem for $n$-tuples and $k$ colors is not computably reducible to Ramsey's theorem for $n$-tuples and $\ell$ colors. In this sense, Ramsey's theorem is not robust with respect to his number of colors over computable reducibility. Finally, we separate the thin set and free set theorem from Ramsey's theorem for pairs and identify an infinite decreasing hierarchy of thin set theorems in reverse mathematics. This shows that in reverse mathematics, the strength of Ramsey's theorem is very sensitive to the number of colors in the output set. In particular, it enables us to answer several related questions asked by Cholak, Giusto, Hirst and Jockusch.Comment: 31 page

Lorenz, G\"{o}del and Penrose: New perspectives on determinism and causality in fundamental physics

Despite being known for his pioneering work on chaotic unpredictability, the key discovery at the core of meteorologist Ed Lorenz's work is the link between space-time calculus and state-space fractal geometry. Indeed, properties of Lorenz's fractal invariant set relate space-time calculus to deep areas of mathematics such as G\"{o}del's Incompleteness Theorem. These properties, combined with some recent developments in theoretical and observational cosmology, motivate what is referred to as the `cosmological invariant set postulate': that the universe $U$ can be considered a deterministic dynamical system evolving on a causal measure-zero fractal invariant set $I_U$ in its state space. Symbolic representations of $I_U$ are constructed explicitly based on permutation representations of quaternions. The resulting `invariant set theory' provides some new perspectives on determinism and causality in fundamental physics. For example, whilst the cosmological invariant set appears to have a rich enough structure to allow a description of quantum probability, its measure-zero character ensures it is sparse enough to prevent invariant set theory being constrained by the Bell inequality (consistent with a partial violation of the so-called measurement independence postulate). The primacy of geometry as embodied in the proposed theory extends the principles underpinning general relativity. As a result, the physical basis for contemporary programmes which apply standard field quantisation to some putative gravitational lagrangian is questioned. Consistent with Penrose's suggestion of a deterministic but non-computable theory of fundamental physics, a `gravitational theory of the quantum' is proposed based on the geometry of $I_U$, with potential observational consequences for the dark universe.Comment: This manuscript has been accepted for publication in Contemporary Physics and is based on the author's 9th Dennis Sciama Lecture, given in Oxford and Triest