2,486 research outputs found

    The number of matchings in random graphs

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    We study matchings on sparse random graphs by means of the cavity method. We first show how the method reproduces several known results about maximum and perfect matchings in regular and Erdos-Renyi random graphs. Our main new result is the computation of the entropy, i.e. the leading order of the logarithm of the number of solutions, of matchings with a given size. We derive both an algorithm to compute this entropy for an arbitrary graph with a girth that diverges in the large size limit, and an analytic result for the entropy in regular and Erdos-Renyi random graph ensembles.Comment: 17 pages, 6 figures, to be published in Journal of Statistical Mechanic

    Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents

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    Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several well-studied NP-hard stable matching problems including Max SMTI (that of finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belong to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed to describe the instance. For Max SMTI this tractability result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one `exceptional' candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists, even if the number of types is bounded by a constant.Comment: Results on SMTI appear in proceedings of WINE 2018; Section 6 contains work in progres

    The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples: complexity and integer programming models

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    The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (hr) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. In this paper we give a new NP-completeness result for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, in highly restricted instances of hrc, and also an inapproximability bound for finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in equally restricted instances of hrc. Further, we present a full description of the first Integer Programming model for finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of hrc and we describe empirical results when this model applied to randomly generated instances of hrc

    Sub-channel Assignment, Power Allocation and User Scheduling for Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access Networks

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    In this paper, we study the resource allocation and user scheduling problem for a downlink nonorthogonal multiple access network where the base station allocates spectrum and power resources to a set of users. We aim to jointly optimize the sub-channel assignment and power allocation to maximize the weighted total sum-rate while taking into account user fairness. We formulate the sub-channel allocation problem as equivalent to a many-to-many two-sided user-subchannel matching game in which the set of users and sub-channels are considered as two sets of players pursuing their own interests. We then propose a matching algorithm which converges to a two-side exchange stable matching after a limited number of iterations. A joint solution is thus provided to solve the sub-channel assignment and power allocation problems iteratively. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm greatly outperforms the orthogonal multiple access scheme and a previous non-orthogonal multiple access scheme.Comment: Accepted as a regular paper by IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication
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