3,685 research outputs found
Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations
Mechanism Design for Team Formation
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has
addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for
the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition
formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only
from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the
mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and
equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team
formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature.
We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions
of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have
desirable theoretical properties. However, we use extensive experiments to show
our second novel mechanism, despite having no theoretical guarantees,
empirically achieves good incentive compatibility, welfare, and fairness.Comment: 12 page
Reciprocity-driven Sparse Network Formation
A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are
based on reciprocity. Peers receive from the network an amount of resources
commensurate with their contribution. We assume the network is fully connected,
and impose sparsity constraints on peer interactions. Finding the sparsest
exchanges that achieve a desired level of reciprocity is in general NP-hard. To
capture near-optimal allocations, we introduce variants of the Eisenberg-Gale
convex program with sparsity penalties. We derive decentralized algorithms,
whereby peers approximately compute the sparsest allocations, by reweighted l1
minimization. The algorithms implement new proportional-response dynamics, with
nonlinear pricing. The trade-off between sparsity and reciprocity and the
properties of graphs induced by sparse exchanges are examined.Comment: 19 page
Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New Yorkâs LaGuardia Airport
We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the âHigh Density Rule,â which defined the slot controls employed at New Yorkâs LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, FAA and DOT executives, airline representatives and other members of the air transportation community. The first simulation placed participants in a stressful, high congestion future scenario and then allowed participants to react and problem solve under various administrative measures and congestion pricing options. The second simulation was a mock slot auction in which participants bid on LGA arrival and departure slots for fictitious airlines.Auctions, airport slot auctions, combinatorial auctions
Environmental analysis for application layer networks
Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechners ĂŒber das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, wĂ€hrend sie die HeterogenitĂ€t der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses fĂŒr einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt
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