Managed competition in health care in the Netherlands and Germany: Theoretical foundation, empirical findings and policy conclusions

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Linking Policy Research and Practice in 'STIG Systems': Many Obstacles, but Some Ways Forward

This paper reflects on the relevance of systems thinking about the interdependent policy issues bearing on the dynamics of science, technology and innovation in their relationship to economic growth. Considering the approach that characterizes much of the current economics literatures treatment of technology and growth policies, we pose the critical question: what kind of systems paradigm is likely to prove particularly fruitful in that particular problem-domain: Evolutionary, neo-Schumpeterian, and complex system dynamics approaches are conceptually attractive and we analyze their respective virtues while also acknowledging their more serious problematic features. Those become visible quickly when trying connect systems-relevant research with practical policy-making in this field. Not content to have simply identified some significant obstructions in the path toward that goal, the paper also suggests some potentially feasible ways forward.Techonological Change, systems paradigm, STIG systems,

Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation

This Article examines zero-price regulation, the major distinguishing feature of many modern "network neutrality" proposals. A zero-price rule prohibits a broadband Internet access provider from charging an application or content provider (collectively, "content provider") to send information to consumers. The Article differentiates two access provider strategies thought to justify a zero-price rule. Exclusion is anticompetitive behavior that harms a content provider to favor its rival. Extraction is a toll imposed upon content providers to raise revenue. Neither strategy raises policy concerns that justify implementation of a broad zero-price rule. First, there is no economic exclusion argument that justifies the zero-price rule as a general matter, given existing legal protections against exclusion. A stronger but narrow argument for regulation exists in certain cases in which the output of social producers, such as Wikipedia, competes with ordinary market-produced content. Second, prohibiting direct extraction is undesirable and counterproductive, in part because it induces costly and unregulated indirect extraction. I conclude, therefore, that recent calls for broad-based zero-price regulation are mistaken.

Designing Competition Policy for Telecommunications

This paper explores the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. Among other things it argues that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. Regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators’ constituency. Moreover, an emphasis on dynamic efficiency requires the short-term regulator to take the “long view” – fostering the competitive process rather than emulating the competitive outcome.

Bank regulation and the network paradigm : policy implications for developing and transition economies

Current issues in banking policy range from the need to construct basic institutions and incentive structures in transition economies, to the challenges posed by the increasingly complex interactions involved in contemporary banking. The authors of this report outline the basic regulatory framework needed to reduce bank failures, as shown by recent experience. Theoreticians note that banking increasingly displays network characteristics that may call for corrective action but make policy intervention ineffective or counterproductive. Networks are susceptible to externalities, redundancy, (ensuring that flows cannot be obstructed by blocking just one path), and a tendency to adapt to disturbances in a complex manner. Regulation is justified, but the complexity of the network makes successful interventions hard to design. Supervision has a role, and the authors outline the basic regulatory measures needed, but the blurring of boundaries between banking and the rest of the financial network has placed an upper bound on the effectiveness of supervision. The authors conclude that although bank failures--mitigated by deposit insurance to protect small savers--must be put up with in designing banking policy, the social cost of bank failure is not as high as is sometimes thought.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

FSEA 2014 – Proceedings of the AVI 2014 Workshop on Fostering Smart Energy Applications through Advanced Visual Interfaces

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to FSEA 2014, the AVI 2014 workshop on Fostering Smart Energy Applications through Advanced Visual Interfaces. This workshop focuses on advanced interaction, interface, and visualization techniques for energy-related applications, tools, and services. It brings together researchers and practitioners from a diverse range of background, including interaction design, human-computer interaction, visualization, computer games, and other fields concerned with the development of advanced visual interfaces for smart energy applications. FSEA 2014 is the result of the efforts of many people involved in its organization, including our programme committee, and others who have assisted us in putting this workshop together