5 research outputs found

    Analyzing temporal role based access control models

    No full text
    Today, Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is the de facto model used for advanced access control, and is widely deployed in diverse enterprises of all sizes. Several extensions to the authorization as well as the administrative models for RBAC have been adopted in recent years. In this paper, we consider the temporal extension of RBAC (TRBAC), and develop safety analysis techniques for it. Safety analysis is essential for understanding the implications of security policies both at the stage of specification and modification. Towards this end, in this paper, we first define an administrative model for TRBAC. Our strategy for performing safety analysis is to appropriately decompose the TRBAC analysis problem into multiple subproblems similar to RBAC. Along with making the analysis simpler, this enables us to leverage and adapt existing analysis techniques developed for traditional RBAC. We have adapted and experimented with employing two state of the art analysis approaches developed for RBAC as well as tools developed for software testing. Our results show that our approach is both feasible and flexible

    Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control Model

    Get PDF
    Information protection is a key issue for the acceptance and adoption of pervasive computing systems where various portable devices such as smart phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and laptop computers are being used to share information and to access digital resources via wireless connection to the Internet. Because these are resources constrained devices and highly mobile, changes in the environmental context or device context can affect the security of the system a great deal. A proper security mechanism must be put in place which is able to cope with changing environmental and system context. Usage CONtrol (UCON) model is the latest major enhancement of the traditional access control models which enables mutability of subject and object attributes, and continuity of control on usage of resources. In UCON, access permission decision is based on three factors: authorisations, obligations and conditions. While authorisations and obligations are requirements that must be fulfilled by the subject and the object, conditions are subject and object independent requirements that must be satisfied by the environment. As a consequence, access permission may be revoked (and the access stopped) as a result of changes in the environment regardless of whether the authorisations and obligations requirements are met. This constitutes a major shortcoming of the UCON model in pervasive computing systems which constantly strive to adapt to environmental changes so as to minimise disruptions to the user. We propose a Context-Aware and Adaptive Usage Control (CA-UCON) model which extends the traditional UCON model to enable adaptation to environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access. Indeed, when the authorisation and obligations requirements are fulfilled by the subject and object, and the conditions requirements fail due to changes in the environmental or the system context, our proposed model CA-UCON triggers specific actions in order to adapt to the new situation, so as to ensure continuity of usage. We then propose an architecture of CA-UCON model, presenting its various components. In this model, we integrated the adaptation decision with usage decision architecture, the comprehensive definition of each components and reveals the functions performed by each components in the architecture are presented. We also propose a novel computational model of our CA-UCON architecture. This model is formally specified as a finite state machine. It demonstrates how the access request of the subject is handled in CA-UCON model, including detail with regards to revoking of access and actions undertaken due to context changes. The extension of the original UCON architecture can be understood from this model. The formal specification of the CA-UCON is presented utilising the Calculus of Context-aware Ambients (CCA). This mathematical notation is considered suitable for modelling mobile and context-aware systems and has been preferred over alternatives for the following reasons: (i) Mobility and Context awareness are primitive constructs in CCA; (ii) A system's properties can be formally analysed; (iii) Most importantly, CCA specifications are executable allowing early validation of system properties and accelerated development of prototypes. For evaluation of CA-UCON model, a real-world case study of a ubiquitous learning (u-learning) system is selected. We propose a CA-UCON model for the u-learning system. This model is then formalised in CCA and the resultant specification is executed and analysed using an execution environment of CCA. Finally, we investigate the enforcement approaches for CA-UCON model. We present the CA-UCON reference monitor architecture with its components. We then proceed to demonstrate three types of enforcement architectures of the CA-UCON model: centralised architecture, distributed architecture and hybrid architecture. These are discussed in detail, including the analysis of their merits and drawbacks

    Automated Safety Analysis of Administrative Temporal Role-Based Access Control (ATRBAC) Policies using Mohawk+T

    Get PDF
    Safety analysis is recognized as a fundamental problem in access control. It has been studied for various access control schemes in the literature. Recent work has proposed an administrative model for Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) policies called Administrative TRBAC (ATRBAC). We address ATRBAC-safety. We first identify that the problem is PSPACE-complete. This is a much tighter identification of the computational complexity of the problem than prior work, which shows only that the problem is decidable. With this result as the basis, we propose an approach that leverages an existing open-source software tool called Mohawk to address ATRBAC-safety. Our approach is to efficiently reduce ATRBAC-safety to ARBAC-safety, and then use Mohawk. We have conducted a thorough empirical assessment. In the course of our assessment, we came up with a "reduction toolkit," which allows us to reduce Mohawk+T input instances to instances that existing tools support. Our results suggest that there are some input classes for which Mohawk+T outperforms existing tools, and others for which existing tools outperform Mohawk+T. The source code for Mohawk+T is available for public download

    Problems in Cloud Security, Access Control and Logic Locking

    Get PDF
    In this thesis, we study problems related to security in three different contexts: cloud scheduling, access control, and logic locking to protect digital ICs. The first set of problems relates to security in cloud computing. Prior work suggests that scheduling, with security as a consideration, can be effective in minimizing information leakage, via side-channels, that can exist when virtual machines (VMs) co-reside in clouds. We analyze the overhead that is incurred by such an approach. We first pose and answer a fundamental question: is the problem tractable? We show that the seemingly simpler sub-cases of initial placement and migration across only two equal-capacity servers are both intractable (NP-hard). However, a decision version of the general problem to which the optimization version is related polynomially is in NP. With these results as the basis, we make several other contributions. We revisit recent work that proposes a greedy algorithm for this problem, called Nomad. We establish that if P != NP, then there exist infinitely many classes of input, each with an infinite number of inputs, for which a decrease in information leakage is possible, but Nomad provides none, let alone minimize it. We establish also that a mapping to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) in prior work is deficient in that the mapping can be inefficient (exponential-time), and therefore does not accurately convey the overhead of such an approach that actually decreases information leakage. We present our efficient reductions to ILP and boolean satisfiability in conjunctive normal form (CNF-SAT). We have implemented these approaches and conducted an empirical assessment using the same ILP solver as prior work, and a SAT solver. Our analytical and empirical results more accurately convey the overhead that is incurred by an approach that actually provides security (decrease in information leakage). The second set of problems relates to access control. We pose and study forensic analysis in the context of access control systems. Forensics seeks to answer questions about past states of a system, and thereby provides important clues and evidence in the event of a security incident. Access control deals with who may perform what action on a resource and is an important security function. We argue that access control is an important context in which to consider forensic analysis, and observe that it is a natural complement of safety analysis, which has been considered extensively in the literature. We pose the forensic analysis problem for access control systems abstractly, and instantiate it for three schemes from the literature: a well-known access matrix scheme, a role-based scheme, and a discretionary scheme. In particular, we ask what the computational complexity of forensic analysis is, and compare it to the computational complexity of safety analysis for each of these schemes. We observe that in the worst-case, forensic analysis lies in the same complexity class as safety analysis. We consider also the notion of logs, i.e., data that can be collected over time to aid forensic analysis. We present results for sufficient and minimal logs that render forensic analysis for the three schemes efficient. This motivates discussions on goal-directed logging, with the explicit intent of aiding forensic analysis. We carry out a case-study in the realistic setting of a serverless cloud application, and observe that goal-directed logging can be highly effective. Our work makes contributions at the foundations of information security, and its practical implications. The third set of problems relates to logic locking to protect digital integrated circuits (ICs) against untrusted semiconductor foundries. We make two sets of complementary contributions, all rooted in foundations and bolstered by implementations and empirical results. Our first set of contributions regards observations about prior schemes and attacks, and our second is a new security notion. Towards the former, we make two contributions. (a) We revisit a prior approach called XOR-locking that has been demonstrated to be susceptible, in practice, to a particular attack called the SAT attack. We establish that (i) there exist circuits that are invulnerable to the SAT attack when XOR-locked with even a 1-bit key, and, (ii) there is a particular property that is inherent to benchmark circuits that explains why the SAT attack is successful against XOR-locked versions of those. Both (i) and (ii) are rooted in computing foundations: for (i), one-way functions; for (ii), average-case computational complexity, specifically, the class distP. (b) We revisit a state-of-art logic locking approach called TTLock whose generalization called SFLL-HD has been argued to be ``provably secure'' in prior work. We devise a new, probabilistic attack against TTLock. We explain, from foundations, why benchmark circuits that are locked using TTLock are susceptible to our new attack. Our observations (a) and (b), and prior work on attacks, informs our second contribution, which is a new security notion. Our notion is at least as strong as the property that underlies the SAT attack

    Polynomial Timed Reductions to Solve Computer Security Problems in Access Control, Ethereum Smart Contract, Cloud VM Scheduling, and Logic Locking.

    Get PDF
    This thesis addresses computer security problems in: Access Control, Ethereum Smart Contracts, Cloud VM Scheduling, and Logic Locking. These problems are solved using polynomially timed reductions to 2 complexity classes: PSPACE-Complete and NP-Complete. This thesis is divided into 2 parts, problems reduced to: Model Checking (PSPACE-Complete) and Integer Linear Programming (ILP) (NP-Complete). The PSPACE-Complete problems are: Safety Analysis of Administrative Temporal Role Based Access Control (ATRBAC) Policies, and Safety Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts. The NP-Complete problems are: Minimizing Information Leakage in Virtual Machine (VM) Cloud Environments using VM Migrations, and Attacking Logic Locked Circuits using a Reduction to Integer Linear Programming (ILP). In Chapter 3, I create the Cree Administrative Temporal Role Based Access Control (ATRBAC)-Safety solver. Which is a reduction from ATRBAC-Safety to Model Checking. I create 4 general performance techniques which can be utilized in any ATRBAC-Safety solver. 1. Polynomial Time Solving, which is able to solve specific archetypes of ATRBAC-Safety policies using a polynomial timed algorithm. 2. Static Pruning, which includes 2 methods for reducing the size of the policy without effecting the result of the safety query. 3. Abstraction Refinement, which can increase the speed for reachable safety queries by only solving a subset of the original policy. 4. Bound Estimation, which creates a bound on the number of steps from the initial state, where a satisfying state must exist. This is directly used by the model checker's bounded model checking mode, but can be utilized by any solver with a bound limiting parameter. In Chapter 4, I analyze ATRBAC-Safety policies to identify some of the ``sources of complexity'' which make solving ATRBAC-Safety policies difficult. I provide analysis of the sources of complexity that exists in the previously published datasets [128,90,54]. I perform analysis of Cree's performance techniques on the previous datasets. I create 2 new datasets, which are shown to be hard instances of ATRBAC-Safety. I analyze the new datasets to show how they achieve this hardness and how they differ from each other and the previous datasets. In Chapter 5, I create a novel reduction from a Reduced-Solidity Smart Contract, subset of available Solidity features, to Model Checking. This reduction reduces Reduced-Solidity Smart Contract into a Finite State Machine and then reduces to an instance of a Model Checking problem. This provides the ability to test smart contracts published on the Ethereum blockchain and test if there exists bugs or malicious code. I perform empirical analysis on select Smart contracts. In Chapter 6, I create 2 methods for generating instances of ATRBAC policies into Solidity Smart Contracts. The first method is the Generic ATRBAC Smart Contract. This method requires no modification before deployment. After deployed the owner is able to create, and maintain, the policy using special access functions. The special action functions are automated with code that converts an ATRBAC policy into a series of transactions the owner can run. The second method is the Baked ATRBAC Smart Contract. This method takes an ATRBAC policy and reduces it to a Smart Contract instance with no special access functions. The smart contract can then be deployed by anyone, and that person will have no special access. I perform an empirical analysis on the setup costs, transaction costs, and security each provides. In Chapter 7, I create a new reduction from Minimizing Information Leakage via Virtual Machine (VM) Migrations to Integer Linear Programming (ILP). I compare a polynomial algorithm by Moon et. al. [71], my ILP reduction, and a reduction to CNF-SAT that is not included in this thesis. The polynomial method is faster, but the problem is NP-Complete thus that solution must have sacrificed something to obtain the polynomial time speed (unless P = NP). I show instances in which the polynomial time algorithm does not produce the minimum total information leakage, but the ILP and CNF-SAT reductions are able to. In addition to this, I show that Total Information Leakage also has a security vulnerability for non-zero information leakage using the model. I propose an alternative method to Total Information Leakage, called Max Client-to-Client Information Leakage, which removes the vulnerability at the cost of increased total information leakage. In Chapter 8, I create a reduction from the Key Recovery Attack on Logic Locked Circuits to Integer Linear Programming (ILP). This is a recreation of the ``SAT Attack'' using ILP. I provide an empirical analysis of the ILP attack and compare it to the SAT-Attack. I show that ``ILP Attack'' is a viable attack, thus future claims of ``SAT-Attack Resistant Logic Locking Techniques'' need to also show resistance to all potential NP-Complete attacks
    corecore