354 research outputs found
Information Directed Sampling for Stochastic Bandits with Graph Feedback
We consider stochastic multi-armed bandit problems with graph feedback, where
the decision maker is allowed to observe the neighboring actions of the chosen
action. We allow the graph structure to vary with time and consider both
deterministic and Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graph models. For such a graph
feedback model, we first present a novel analysis of Thompson sampling that
leads to tighter performance bound than existing work. Next, we propose new
Information Directed Sampling based policies that are graph-aware in their
decision making. Under the deterministic graph case, we establish a Bayesian
regret bound for the proposed policies that scales with the clique cover number
of the graph instead of the number of actions. Under the random graph case, we
provide a Bayesian regret bound for the proposed policies that scales with the
ratio of the number of actions over the expected number of observations per
iteration. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical result
for stochastic bandits with random graph feedback. Finally, using numerical
evaluations, we demonstrate that our proposed IDS policies outperform existing
approaches, including adaptions of upper confidence bound, -greedy
and Exp3 algorithms.Comment: Accepted by AAAI 201
von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems for Causal Decision Making
Causal thinking and decision making under uncertainty are fundamental aspects
of intelligent reasoning. Decision making under uncertainty has been well
studied when information is considered at the associative (probabilistic)
level. The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a
formal criterion for rational choice using purely associative information.
Causal inference often yields uncertainty about the exact causal structure, so
we consider what kinds of decisions are possible in those conditions. In this
work, we consider decision problems in which available actions and consequences
are causally connected. After recalling a previous causal decision making
result, which relies on a known causal model, we consider the case in which the
causal mechanism that controls some environment is unknown to a rational
decision maker. In this setting we state and prove a causal version of Savage's
Theorem, which we then use to develop a notion of causal games with its
respective causal Nash equilibrium. These results highlight the importance of
causal models in decision making and the variety of potential applications.Comment: Submitted to Journal of Causal Inferenc
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