Information Directed Sampling for Stochastic Bandits with Graph Feedback

We consider stochastic multi-armed bandit problems with graph feedback, where the decision maker is allowed to observe the neighboring actions of the chosen action. We allow the graph structure to vary with time and consider both deterministic and Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graph models. For such a graph feedback model, we first present a novel analysis of Thompson sampling that leads to tighter performance bound than existing work. Next, we propose new Information Directed Sampling based policies that are graph-aware in their decision making. Under the deterministic graph case, we establish a Bayesian regret bound for the proposed policies that scales with the clique cover number of the graph instead of the number of actions. Under the random graph case, we provide a Bayesian regret bound for the proposed policies that scales with the ratio of the number of actions over the expected number of observations per iteration. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical result for stochastic bandits with random graph feedback. Finally, using numerical evaluations, we demonstrate that our proposed IDS policies outperform existing approaches, including adaptions of upper confidence bound, $\epsilon$-greedy and Exp3 algorithms.Comment: Accepted by AAAI 201

von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems for Causal Decision Making

Causal thinking and decision making under uncertainty are fundamental aspects of intelligent reasoning. Decision making under uncertainty has been well studied when information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level. The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a formal criterion for rational choice using purely associative information. Causal inference often yields uncertainty about the exact causal structure, so we consider what kinds of decisions are possible in those conditions. In this work, we consider decision problems in which available actions and consequences are causally connected. After recalling a previous causal decision making result, which relies on a known causal model, we consider the case in which the causal mechanism that controls some environment is unknown to a rational decision maker. In this setting we state and prove a causal version of Savage's Theorem, which we then use to develop a notion of causal games with its respective causal Nash equilibrium. These results highlight the importance of causal models in decision making and the variety of potential applications.Comment: Submitted to Journal of Causal Inferenc