1,503 research outputs found
Non-cooperative Feedback Rate Control Game for Channel State Information in Wireless Networks
It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is
of great importance for dowlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks.
However, the existing work typically researched the CSI feedback problem for
each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the
interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this
end, in this paper, we propose an alternative approach to investigate the CSI
feedback rate control problem in the analytical setting of a game theoretic
framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a
number of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first
present a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game (NFC), in which each MS
selects the feedback rate to maximize its performance in a distributed way. To
improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce
pricing, called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price
(NFCP). The game utility is defined as the performance gain by CSI feedback
minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback rate. The existence of
the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback
protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by
adjusting the pricing factor, the distributed NFCP game results in close
optimal performance compared with that of the centralized scheme.Comment: 26 pages, 10 figures; IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, special issue on Game Theory in Wireless Communications, 201
CSMA Local Area Networking under Dynamic Altruism
In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks
(LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system.
Rather than assuming "by rule" conformance to a protocol designed to regulate
packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game
framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. The effects
of altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for both the ALOHA and CSMA
frameworks in the quasistationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either
power or throughput based costs of networking, and the cases of identical or
heterogeneous (independent) users/players. In a numerical study we consider
diverse players, and we see that the effects of altruism for similar players
can be beneficial in the presence of significant congestion, but excessive
altruism may lead to underuse of the channel when demand is low
Resource Allocation with Reverse Pricing for Communication Networks
Reverse pricing has been recognized as an effective tool to handle demand
uncertainty in the travel industry (e.g., airlines and hotels). To investigate
its viability for communication networks, we study the practical limitations of
(operator-driven) time-dependent pricing that has been recently introduced,
taking into account demand uncertainty. Compared to (operator-driven)
time-dependent pricing, we show that the proposed pricing scheme can achieve
"triple-win" solutions: an increase in the total average revenue of the
operator; higher average resource utilization efficiency; and an increment in
the total average payoff of the users. Our findings provide a new outlook on
resource allocation, and design guidelines for adopting the reverse pricing
scheme.Comment: to appear in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)
2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (6 pages, 3 figures
Band Allocation for Cognitive Radios with Buffered Primary and Secondary Users
In this paper, we study band allocation of buffered secondary
users (SUs) to orthogonal primary licensed bands, where each
primary band is assigned to one primary user (PU). Each SU is assigned to one
of the available primary bands with a certain probability designed to satisfy
some specified quality of service (QoS) requirements for the SUs. In the
proposed system, only one SU is assigned to a particular band. The optimization
problem used to obtain the stability region's envelope (closure) is shown to be
a linear program. We compare the stability region of the proposed system with
that of a system where each SU chooses a band randomly with some assignment
probability. We also compare with a fixed (deterministic) assignment system,
where only one SU is assigned to one of the primary bands all the time. We
prove the advantage of the proposed system over the other systems.Comment: Accepted in WCNC 201
The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084
The effect of (non-)competing brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers’ level. We also study cooperation among a subset of brokers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.Accepted manuscrip
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