13 research outputs found
Analysing Password Protocol Security Against Off-line Dictionary Attacks
We study the security of password protocols against off-line dictionary attacks. In addition to the standard adversary abilities, we also consider further cryptographic advantages given to the adversary when considering the password protocol being instantiated with particular encryption schemes. We work with the applied pi-calculus of Abadi and Fournet, in which the (new) adversary abilities are modelled as equations between terms. As case studies, we analyse the Encrypted Password Transmission (EPT) protocol of Halevi and Krawczyk, and the wellknown Encrypted Key (EKE) of Bellovin and Merritt. In the latter, we find an attack that arises when considering the ability of distinguishing ciphertexts from random noise. We propose a modification to EKE that prevents this attack
Crypto-Verifying Protocol Implementations in ML
We intend to narrow the gap between concrete
implementations and verified models of cryptographic protocols.
We consider protocols implemented in F#, a variant of ML, and
verified using CryptoVerif, Blanchet's protocol verifier for
computational cryptography.
We experiment with compilers from F# code to CryptoVerif processes,
and from CryptoVerif declarations to F# code.
We present two case studies: an implementation of the Otway-Rees
protocol, and an implementation of a simplified password-based
authentication protocol. In both cases, we obtain concrete security
guarantees for a computational model closely related to
executable code
Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an
adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model
is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and
replay messages, and decipher them with known keys. The Dolev-Yao model is a
useful abstraction, but it suffers from some drawbacks: it cannot handle the
adversary knowing protocol-specific information, and it cannot handle
probabilistic notions, such as the adversary attempting to guess the keys. We
show how we can analyze security protocols under different adversary models by
using a logic with a notion of algorithmic knowledge. Roughly speaking,
adversaries are assumed to use algorithms to compute their knowledge; adversary
capabilities are captured by suitable restrictions on the algorithms used. We
show how we can model the standard Dolev-Yao adversary in this setting, and how
we can capture more general capabilities including protocol-specific knowledge
and guesses.Comment: 23 pages. A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of
FaSec'0
YAPA: A generic tool for computing intruder knowledge
Reasoning about the knowledge of an attacker is a necessary step in many
formal analyses of security protocols. In the framework of the applied pi
calculus, as in similar languages based on equational logics, knowledge is
typically expressed by two relations: deducibility and static equivalence.
Several decision procedures have been proposed for these relations under a
variety of equational theories. However, each theory has its particular
algorithm, and none has been implemented so far. We provide a generic procedure
for deducibility and static equivalence that takes as input any convergent
rewrite system. We show that our algorithm covers most of the existing decision
procedures for convergent theories. We also provide an efficient
implementation, and compare it briefly with the tools ProVerif and KiSs
Analysing Password Protocol Security Against Off-line Dictionary Attacks
We study the security of password protocols against off-line dictionary attacks. In addition to the standard adversary abilities, we also consider further cryptographic advantages given to the adversary when considering the password protocol being instantiated with particular encryption schemes. We work with the applied pi-calculus of Abadi and Fournet, in which the (new) adversary abilities are modelled as equations between terms. As case studies, we analyse the Encrypted Password Transmission (EPT) protocol of Halevi and Krawczyk, and the wellknown Encrypted Key (EKE) of Bellovin and Merritt. In the latter, we find an attack that arises when considering the ability of distinguishing ciphertexts from random noise. We propose a modification to EKE that prevents this attack
Reducing Equational Theories for the Decision of Static Equivalence
International audienceStatic equivalence is a well established notion of indistinguishability of sequences of terms which is useful in the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols. Static equivalence modulo equational theories allows for a more accurate representation of cryptographic primitives by modelling properties of operators by equational axioms. We develop a method that allows us in some cases to simplify the task of deciding static equivalence in a multi-sorted setting, by removing a symbol from the term signature and reducing the problem to several simpler equational theories. We illustrate our technique at hand of bilinear pairings
Data Minimisation in Communication Protocols: A Formal Analysis Framework and Application to Identity Management
With the growing amount of personal information exchanged over the Internet,
privacy is becoming more and more a concern for users. One of the key
principles in protecting privacy is data minimisation. This principle requires
that only the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish a certain
goal is collected and processed. "Privacy-enhancing" communication protocols
have been proposed to guarantee data minimisation in a wide range of
applications. However, currently there is no satisfactory way to assess and
compare the privacy they offer in a precise way: existing analyses are either
too informal and high-level, or specific for one particular system. In this
work, we propose a general formal framework to analyse and compare
communication protocols with respect to privacy by data minimisation. Privacy
requirements are formalised independent of a particular protocol in terms of
the knowledge of (coalitions of) actors in a three-layer model of personal
information. These requirements are then verified automatically for particular
protocols by computing this knowledge from a description of their
communication. We validate our framework in an identity management (IdM) case
study. As IdM systems are used more and more to satisfy the increasing need for
reliable on-line identification and authentication, privacy is becoming an
increasingly critical issue. We use our framework to analyse and compare four
identity management systems. Finally, we discuss the completeness and
(re)usability of the proposed framework