Identification of Predicate Crimes Related to Binary Options Affiliates Money Laundering Crime

Binary options are increasingly familiar to the public with online promotions on various social media by Indra Kenz. The link between binary options affiliation and money laundering crimes is that the money generated from promoting binary options is illegal because regulations stipulate that binary options are illegal investments. The research aims to identify predicate crimes related to binary options affiliates in action money laundering crimes. The research is normative juridical with a statute approach. The data used were primary, tertiary secondary. At the same time, data processing was obtained through data selection, classification, and systematization. The data processed was analyzed qualitatively, and conclusions were drawn using inductive methods. Based on the research and discussion results, binary options affiliation could be charged with the predicate crime of fraud as stipulated in Article 378 of the Criminal Code and Article 45A Paragraph (1) Juncto. Article 28 Paragraph (1) Law Number 19 of 2016 concerning ITE. Likewise, with gambling Article 303 Paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. The results of playing binary options include criminal acts of money laundering due to gambling and fraud, so the origin of money or assets must be hidden first to look legal. The authors suggest that more detailed arrangements are needed to ensnare binary options affiliates. The arrangements can be learned from the modus operandi and approaches regarding affiliates and binary options

Wiretap and Gelfand-Pinsker Channels Analogy and its Applications

An analogy framework between wiretap channels (WTCs) and state-dependent point-to-point channels with non-causal encoder channel state information (referred to as Gelfand-Pinker channels (GPCs)) is proposed. A good sequence of stealth-wiretap codes is shown to induce a good sequence of codes for a corresponding GPC. Consequently, the framework enables exploiting existing results for GPCs to produce converse proofs for their wiretap analogs. The analogy readily extends to multiuser broadcasting scenarios, encompassing broadcast channels (BCs) with deterministic components, degradation ordering between users, and BCs with cooperative receivers. Given a wiretap BC (WTBC) with two receivers and one eavesdropper, an analogous Gelfand-Pinsker BC (GPBC) is constructed by converting the eavesdropper's observation sequence into a state sequence with an appropriate product distribution (induced by the stealth-wiretap code for the WTBC), and non-causally revealing the states to the encoder. The transition matrix of the state-dependent GPBC is extracted from WTBC's transition law, with the eavesdropper's output playing the role of the channel state. Past capacity results for the semi-deterministic (SD) GPBC and the physically-degraded (PD) GPBC with an informed receiver are leveraged to furnish analogy-based converse proofs for the analogous WTBC setups. This characterizes the secrecy-capacity regions of the SD-WTBC and the PD-WTBC, in which the stronger receiver also observes the eavesdropper's channel output. These derivations exemplify how the wiretap-GP analogy enables translating results on one problem into advances in the study of the other

Information thermodynamics of financial markets: the Glosten-Milgrom model

The Glosten-Milgrom model describes a single asset market, where informed traders interact with a market maker, in the presence of noise traders. We derive an analogy between this financial model and a Szil\'ard information engine by {\em i)} showing that the optimal work extraction protocol in the latter coincides with the pricing strategy of the market maker in the former and {\em ii)} defining a market analogue of the physical temperature from the analysis of the distribution of market orders. Then we show that the expected gain of informed traders is bounded above by the product of this market temperature with the amount of information that informed traders have, in exact analogy with the corresponding formula for the maximal expected amount of work that can be extracted from a cycle of the information engine. This suggests that recent ideas from information thermodynamics may shed light on financial markets, and lead to generalised inequalities, in the spirit of the extended second law of thermodynamics