Multi-Agent Fault Tolerance Inspired by a Computational Analysis of Cancer

Abstract In cancer biology, it is known that cancer cells can disappear without therapy, but not how. We propose that cells communicate such that primarily malfunctioning cells (tumors) die. We also propose that this same communication can be used as inspiration for a faulttolerance mechanism for multi-agent and distributed systems to remove faulty agents using only local information. I examine the communication protocols necessary for removing these faults in both systems

An Exception-Handling Architecture for Open Electronic Marketplaces of Contract Net Software Agents

Software agent marketplaces require the development of new architectures, which are capable of coping with unreliable computational and network infrastructures, limited trust among independently developed agents and the possibility of systemic failures. In analogy with human societies, agent marketplaces will benefit from the introduction of appropriate electronic exception handling institutions, whose role will be to help guarantee efficiency and fairness in the face of these challenges. This paper presents a research methodology for designing and evaluating such electronic institutions. It also describes how the methodology has been applied in order to design and evaluate an exception handling architecture for robust software agent marketplaces based on the contract net protocol

Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis

Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to high-value supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus