Exact algorithms for the matrix bid auction.

In a combinatorial auction, multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. These buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets of the available items. A special kind of combinatorial auction is the so-called matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004). The matrix bid auction imposes restrictions on what a bidder can bid for a subsets of the items. This paper focusses on the winner determination problem, i.e. deciding which bidders should get what items. The winner determination problem of a general combinatorial auction is NP-hard and inapproximable. We discuss the computational complexity of the winner determination problem for a special case of the matrix bid auction. We present two mathematical programming formulations for the general matrix bid auction winner determination problem. Based on one of these formulations, we develop two branch-and-price algorithms to solve the winner determination problem. Finally, we present computational results for these algorithms and compare them with results from a branch-and-cut approach based on Day & Raghavan (2006).Algorithms; Bids; Branch-and-price; Combinatorial auction; Complexity; Computational complexity; Exact algorithm; Mathematical programming; Matrix; Matrix bids; Research; Winner determination;

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst case efficiency of (?????) relative to the optimal solution, and that this bound is optimal, that is, no better approximation exists. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared with existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how byappropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-0963974

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst case efficiency of (?????) relative to the optimal solution, and that this bound is optimal, that is, no better approximation exists. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared with existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how byappropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-0963974

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst-case efficiency of (1-(1/e)) relative to the optimal node embedding, or VNET embedding if virtual links are mapped to exactly one physical link. This bound is optimal, that is, no better polynomial-time approximation algorithm exists, unless P=NP. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared to existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how by appropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.CNS-0963974 - National Science Foundationhttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/ToN-CAD.pdfAccepted manuscrip

A System for Distributed Mechanisms: Design, Implementation and Applications

We describe here a structured system for distributed mechanism design appropriate for both Intranet and Internet applications. In our approach the players dynamically form a network in which they know neither their neighbours nor the size of the network and interact to jointly take decisions. The only assumption concerning the underlying communication layer is that for each pair of processes there is a path of neighbours connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network topologies. We also discuss the implementation of this system which consists of a sequence of layers. The lower layers deal with the operations that implement the basic primitives of distributed computing, namely low level communication and distributed termination, while the upper layers use these primitives to implement high level communication among players, including broadcasting and multicasting, and distributed decision making. This yields a highly flexible distributed system whose specific applications are realized as instances of its top layer. This design is implemented in Java. The system supports at various levels fault-tolerance and includes a provision for distributed policing the purpose of which is to exclude `dishonest' players. Also, it can be used for repeated creation of dynamically formed networks of players interested in a joint decision making implemented by means of a tax-based mechanism. We illustrate its flexibility by discussing a number of implemented examples.Comment: 36 pages; revised and expanded versio

Auction-based Task Allocation for Safe and Energy Efficient UAS Parcel Transportation

In this paper, two greedy auction-based algorithms are proposed for the allocation of heterogeneous tasks to a heterogeneous fleet of UAVs. The tasks set is composed of parcel delivery tasks and charge tasks, the latter to guarantee service persistency. An optimization problem is solved by each agent to determine its bid for each task. When considering delivery tasks, the bidder aims at minimizing the energy consumption, while the minimization of the flight time is adopted for charge tasks bids. The algorithms include a path planner that computes the minimum risk path for each task-UAV bid exploiting a 2D risk map of the operational area, defined in an urban environment. Each solution approach is implemented by means of two auction strategies: single-item and multiple-item. Considerations about complexity and efficiency of the algorithms are drawn from Monte Carlo simulations