Immunization in developing countries : its political and organizational determinants

The authors use cross-national social, political, economic, and institutional data to explain why some countries have stronger immunization programs than others, as measured by diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) and measles vaccine coverage rates and the adoption of the hepatitis B vaccine. After reveiwing the existing literature on demand- and supply-side side factors that affect immunization programs, the authors find that the elements that most affect immunization programs in low- and middle-income countries involve broad changes in the global policy environment and contact with international agencies. Democracies tend to have lower coverage rates than autocracies, perhaps because bureaucratic elites have an affinity for immunization programs and are granted more autonomy in autocracies, althought this effect is not visible in low-income countries. The authors also find that the quality of a nation's institutions and its level of development are strongly related to immunization rate coverage and vaccine adoption, and that coverage rates are in general more a function of supply-side than demand effects. there is no evidence that epidemics or polio eradication campaigns affect immunization rates one way or another, or that average immunization rates increase following outbreaks of diphtheria, pertussis, or measles.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Disease Control&Prevention,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Public Health Promotion,Early Child and Children's Health,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Early Child and Children's Health,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,ICT Policy and Strategies,Health Economics&Finance

CareOregon: Transforming the Role of a Medicaid Health Plan From Payer to Partner

Details Triple Aim pilot programs designed to offer patient-centered medical homes and multidisciplinary case management in an effort to improve population health, enhance patients' experience, and slow cost growth

Paying for Quality: Understanding and Assessing Physician Pay-for-Performance Initiatives

Reviews the structure, prevalence, measurement issues, perception, and impact of current quality incentive programs, and discusses how much and under what circumstances they will improve quality of care. Includes descriptions of select programs

Why Not the Best? Results From the National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2011

Assesses the U.S. healthcare system's average performance in 2007-09 as measured by forty-two indicators of health outcomes, quality, access, efficiency, and equity compared with the 2006 and 2008 scorecards and with domestic and international benchmarks

Performance-Based Financing: Report on Feasibility and Implementation Options Final September 2007

This study examines the feasibility of introducing a performance-related bonus scheme in the health sector. After describing the Tanzania health context, we define “Performance-Based Financing”, examine its rationale and review the evidence on its effectiveness. The following sections systematically assess the potential for applying the scheme in Tanzania. On the basis of risks and concerns identified, detailed design options and recommendations are set out. The report concludes with a (preliminary) indication of the costs of such a scheme and recommends a way forward for implementation. We prefer the name “Payment for Performance” or “P4P”. This is because what is envisaged is a bonus payment that is earned by meeting performance targets1. The dominant financing for health care delivery would remain grant-based as at present. There is a strong case for introducing P4P. Its main purpose will be to motivate front-line health workers to improve service delivery performance. In recent years, funding for council health services has increased dramatically, without a commensurate increase in health service output. The need to tighten focus on results is widely acknowledged. So too is the need to hold health providers more accountable for performance at all levels, form the local to the national. P4P is expected to encourage CHMTs and health facilities to “manage by results”; to identify and address local constraints, and to find innovative ways to raise productivity and reach under-served groups. As well as leveraging more effective use of all resources, P4P will provide a powerful incentive at all levels to make sure that HMIS information is complete, accurate and timely. It is expected to enhance accountability between health facilities and their managers / governing committees as well as between the Council Health Department and the Local Government Authority. Better performance-monitoring will enable the national level to track aggregate progress against goals and will assist in identifying under-performers requiring remedial action. We recommend a P4P scheme that provides a monetary team bonus, dependent on a whole facility reaching facility-specific service delivery targets. The bonus would be paid quarterly and shared equally among health staff. It should target all government health facilities at the council level, and should also reward the CHMT for “whole council” performance. All participating facilities/councils are therefore rewarded for improvement rather than absolute levels of performance. Performance indicators should not number more than 10, should represent a “balanced score card” of basic health service delivery, should present no risk of “perverse incentive” and should be readily measurable. The same set of indicators should be used by all. CHMTs would assist facilities in setting targets and monitoring performance. RHMTs would play a similar role with respect to CHMTs. The Council Health Administration would provide a “check and balance” to avoid target manipulation and verify bonus payments due. The major constraint on feasibility is the poor state of health information. Our study confirmed the findings of previous ones, observing substantial omission and error in reports from facilities to CHMTs. We endorse the conclusion of previous reviewers that the main problem lies not with HMIS design, but with its functioning. We advocate a particular focus on empowering and enabling the use of information for management by facilities and CHMTs. We anticipate that P4P, combined with a major effort in HMIS capacity building – at the facility and council level – will deliver dramatic improvements in data quality and completeness. We recommend that the first wave of participating councils are selected on the basis that they can first demonstrate robust and accurate data. We anticipate that P4P for facilities will not deliver the desired benefits unless they have a greater degree of control to solve their own problems. We therefore propose - as a prior and essential condition – the introduction of petty cash imprests for all health facilities. We believe that such a measure would bring major benefits even to facilities that have not yet started P4P. It should also empower Health Facility Committees to play a more meaningful role in health service governance at the local level. We recommend to Government that P4P bonuses, as described here, are implemented across Mainland Tanzania on a phased basis. The main constraint on the pace of roll-out is the time required to bring information systems up to standard. Councils that are not yet ready to institute P4P should get an equivalent amount of money – to be used as general revenue to finance their comprehensive council health plans. We also recommend that up-to-date reporting on performance against service delivery indicators is made a mandatory requirement for all councils and is also agreed as a standard requirement for the Joint Annual Health Sector Review. P4P can also be applied on the “demand-side” – for example to encourage women to present in case of obstetric emergencies. There is a strong empirical evidence base from other countries to demonstrate that such incentives can work. We recommend a separate policy decision on whether or not to introduce demand-side incentives. In our view, they are sufficiently promising to be tried out on an experimental basis. When taken to national scale (all councils, excepting higher level hospitals), the scheme would require annual budgetary provision of about 6 billion shillings for bonus payments. This is equivalent to 1% of the national health budget, or about 3% of budgetary resources for health at the council level. We anticipate that design and implementation costs would amount to about 5 billion shillings over 5 years – the majority of this being devoted to HMIS strengthening at the facility level across the whole country

Avoidable Hospitalizations

Georgia Health Policy Center worked to improve health care in eight of the most rural, medically under served states in the country. The Center conducted research and provided strategic planning for eight Southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, East Texas and West Virginia

J Infect Dis

The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) began building in the late 1980s on a 3-tiered structure of 146 laboratories with different and complementary technical and support capacities (poliovirus isolation, molecular strain characterization including sequencing, quality assurance, and research). The purpose of this network is to provide timely and accurate laboratory results to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Deeply integrated with field case-based surveillance, it ultimately provides molecular epidemiological data from polioviruses used to inform programmatic and immunization activities. This network of global coverage requires substantial investments in laboratory infrastructure, equipment, supplies, reagents, quality assurance, staffing and training, often in resource-limited settings. The GPLN has not only developed country capacities, but it also serves as a model to other global laboratory networks for vaccine-preventable diseases that will endure after the polio eradication goal is achieved. Leveraging lessons learned during past 27 years, the authors discuss options for transitioning GPLN assets to support control of other viral vaccine-preventable, emerging, and reemerging diseases.2017001/World Health Organization/InternationalCC999999/Intramural CDC HHS/United States28838192PMC5853949770

India's Health Initiative: Financing Issues and Options

In response to the challenge of sustaining the health gains achieved in the better-performing states and ensuring that the lagging states catch up with the rest of the country, the Indian government has launched the National Rural Health Mission. A central goal of the effort is to increase public spending on health from the current 1.1 percent of GDP to roughly 2–3 percent of GDP within the next five years. In this paper, we examine the current status of health financing in India, as well as alternatives for realizing maximal health gains for the incremental expenditures.health financing, public spending, India, cost-effectiveness