8,429 research outputs found

    Proof phenomenon as a function of the phenomenology of proving

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    Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: “the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)”. This “exact replica” brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of essences in Wesensschau and of physical objects in perception. What is it like to experience a mathematical proving process? What is the ontological status of a mathematical proof? Can computer assisted provers output a proof? Taking a naturalized world account, I will assess the relationship between mathematics, the physical world and consciousness by introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proving and proof. I will propose that proving is a phenomenological conscious experience. This experience involves a combination of what Kurt Gödel called intuition, and what Husserl called intentionality. In contrast, proof is a function of that process — the mathematical phenomenon — that objectively self-presents a property in the world, and that results from a spatiotemporal unity being subject to the exact laws of nature. In this essay, I apply phenomenology to mathematical proving as a performance of consciousness, that is, a lived experience expressed and formalized in language, in which there is the possibility of formulating intersubjectively shareable meanings

    Computer theorem proving in math

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    We give an overview of issues surrounding computer-verified theorem proving in the standard pure-mathematical context. This is based on my talk at the PQR conference (Brussels, June 2003)

    From Euclidean Geometry to Knots and Nets

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    This document is the Accepted Manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Synthese. Under embargo until 19 September 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1558-x.This paper assumes the success of arguments against the view that informal mathematical proofs secure rational conviction in virtue of their relations with corresponding formal derivations. This assumption entails a need for an alternative account of the logic of informal mathematical proofs. Following examination of case studies by Manders, De Toffoli and Giardino, Leitgeb, Feferman and others, this paper proposes a framework for analysing those informal proofs that appeal to the perception or modification of diagrams or to the inspection or imaginative manipulation of mental models of mathematical phenomena. Proofs relying on diagrams can be rigorous if (a) it is easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates the structure of the mathematical object, (b) the information thus displayed is not metrical and (c) it is possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with other mathematical inferential practices. Proofs that appeal to mental models can be rigorous if the mental models can be externalised as diagrammatic practice that satisfies these three conditions.Peer reviewe

    Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

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    One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.Comment: 58 pages, to appear in "Computability: G\"odel, Turing, Church, and beyond," MIT Press, 2012. Some minor clarifications and corrections; new references adde

    lim+, delta+, and Non-Permutability of beta-Steps

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    Using a human-oriented formal example proof of the (lim+) theorem, i.e. that the sum of limits is the limit of the sum, which is of value for reference on its own, we exhibit a non-permutability of beta-steps and delta+-steps (according to Smullyan's classification), which is not visible with non-liberalized delta-rules and not serious with further liberalized delta-rules, such as the delta++-rule. Besides a careful presentation of the search for a proof of (lim+) with several pedagogical intentions, the main subject is to explain why the order of beta-steps plays such a practically important role in some calculi.Comment: ii + 36 page
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