24,271 research outputs found
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The Co-evolution of Institutions and Technology
We propose a model of growth driven by the co-evolution of institutions and technology. To be consistent with Douglass North (1990, 1991, 1994), institutions are defined as a type of collective knowledge about a specific environment that can prescribe how to adapt general technology before the latter can be actually used. Institutions, then, are treated as a factor in the innovation process, and as such can be purposely accumulated. The simultaneous accumulation of institutions and technology are modeled as an evolutionary game whereby boundedly-rational .rms choose how much to allocate to âinstitutional spendingâ vis-a-vis research expenditures, in anticipation of changes in monopoly pro.ts from technological innovation. Using Taylor and Jonkerâs (1978) Replicator Dynamics to describe the evolution of such strategies, we are able to show how this transition process converges to the steady state model of Romer (1990)
Capital accumulation and entry deterrence: A clarifying note
Investment;Game Theory
Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
We study duopolistic competition in a differentiated market with firms setting prices and quantities, without explicitly imposing market clearing. Unlike the commonly adopted assumption of profit maximizing firms, we assume firm behavior to be shaped by a Darwinian dynamic: the less fitter firm imitates the fitter firm and occasionally firms may experiment with a random price and/or quantity. Our two main findings are that: (i) a market clearing outcome always belongs to the set of feasible long run outcomes, but may co-exist with non-market clearing outcomes with as well excess supply as excess demand being possible; and (ii) there exist parameter configurations for which the only feasible outcomes imply prices above monopoly level.microeconomics ;
Micro-Founded Institutions and Macro-Founded Individuals: The Dual Nature of Profit
Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always due to the collective undertaking of non additively separable human capital investments, this paper introduces a theory of the institutional structure of production where groups are taken as units of analysis in a multi-level competition framework inspired by Marxâs critique of the âabstract manâ. The main result is that monopoly profit is not the only meaningful notion of profit besides the value of individual contribution and, as a consequence, freeentry and competition do not necessarily wipe it outvalue, power, conflict, competition, social classes
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Evaluating Government's Policies on Promoting Smart Metering in Retail Electricity Markets via Agent Based Simulation
Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics
Economics rightfully represents the major basis for competition policy. Next to generating knowledge about competition and its welfare effects, the currently popular 'more-economic approach' is charged with a number of additional hopes and expectations, leading to a reduction of the ambiguities of real-world competition policy. While this article highlights the benefits of economics-based competition policy, it takes a cautious stance towards excessive expectations in particular regarding the idea that a monocultural, 'unified' competition theory as an exact, objective, and unerring scientific approach to antitrust makes normative assessment and generalizations superfluous. In a combination of two lines of argumentation, diversity in competition economics is advocated. Firstly, competition economics is empirically characterized by a considerable pluralism of theories and policy paradigms. This includes deviating views on core concepts like the nature of competition, the meaning of efficiency, or the goals of antitrust. Secondly, it is demonstrated that diversity of theories represents no imperfection of the state of science. In contrast, it is theoretically beneficial for future scientific progress. Therefore, no ultimate competition theory can ever be expected. As a consequence, the 'more-economic approach' must be extended in order to embrace diversity. This does not decrease its meaning and importance but instead puts some of the related high hopes into perspective. --antitrust,more-economic approach,competition policy paradigms,industrial economics,methodology of science
The consequences of endogenous timing for diversification strategies of multimarket firms
When firms diversify into new markets in spite of the existence of diseconomies of scope, not only firms' profits are affected, but also potential welfare is reduced. Nevertheless, multimarket competition is the outcome of a game when players move simultaneously. A Cournot model is developped where players can choose the timing of their action before deciding over quantities. This helps firms to avoid the inefficiencies that ocur with multimarket competition. Whenever the timing game has an impact on the outcome of the basic game, the consequences for welfare are positive. -- Die Diversifikation von Unternehmen in neue MĂ€rkte fĂŒhrt zu Effizienzverlusten und GewinneinbuĂen, wenn dadurch Spezialisierungsvorteile nicht mehr genutzt werden können. Dennoch ist Diversifikation das Ergebnis eines simultanen Cournotspiels, in welchem sich zwei Unternehmen auf zwei MĂ€rkten als potentielle Wettbewerber gegenĂŒberstehen. Die EinfĂŒhrung einer Vorstufe zum Cournotspiel, in welcher Unternehmen den Zeitpunkt ihrer Angebotsentscheidung in beiden MĂ€rkten wĂ€hlen können, kann einen Teil dieser Ineffizienzen beseitigen. Unternehmen konzentrieren sich auf je einen Markt. Wegen der Existenz potentieller Konkurrenz sind die Wohlfahrtswirkungen trotz der resultierenden monopolistischen Marktstruktur im Vergleich zum Ausgangsspiel positiv.
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