458 research outputs found
CENTURION: Incentivizing Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing
The recent proliferation of increasingly capable mobile devices has given
rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that outsource the collection of
sensory data to a crowd of participating workers that carry various mobile
devices. Aware of the paramount importance of effectively incentivizing
participation in such systems, the research community has proposed a wide
variety of incentive mechanisms. However, different from most of these existing
mechanisms which assume the existence of only one data requester, we consider
MCS systems with multiple data requesters, which are actually more common in
practice. Specifically, our incentive mechanism is based on double auction, and
is able to stimulate the participation of both data requesters and workers. In
real practice, the incentive mechanism is typically not an isolated module, but
interacts with the data aggregation mechanism that aggregates workers' data.
For this reason, we propose CENTURION, a novel integrated framework for
multi-requester MCS systems, consisting of the aforementioned incentive and
data aggregation mechanism. CENTURION's incentive mechanism satisfies
truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, as well as
guaranteeing non-negative social welfare, and its data aggregation mechanism
generates highly accurate aggregated results. The desirable properties of
CENTURION are validated through both theoretical analysis and extensive
simulations
Crowd-ML: A Privacy-Preserving Learning Framework for a Crowd of Smart Devices
Smart devices with built-in sensors, computational capabilities, and network
connectivity have become increasingly pervasive. The crowds of smart devices
offer opportunities to collectively sense and perform computing tasks in an
unprecedented scale. This paper presents Crowd-ML, a privacy-preserving machine
learning framework for a crowd of smart devices, which can solve a wide range
of learning problems for crowdsensing data with differential privacy
guarantees. Crowd-ML endows a crowdsensing system with an ability to learn
classifiers or predictors online from crowdsensing data privately with minimal
computational overheads on devices and servers, suitable for a practical and
large-scale employment of the framework. We analyze the performance and the
scalability of Crowd-ML, and implement the system with off-the-shelf
smartphones as a proof of concept. We demonstrate the advantages of Crowd-ML
with real and simulated experiments under various conditions
Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are
clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's
smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come
equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as
accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has
enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm,
such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime
control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior
sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process,
since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information
about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or
maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes
more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for
defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the
current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research
challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN
Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of
smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously
possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the
users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is
paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation.
In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for
participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing
incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently
discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally,
we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in
participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201
Optimal Order Assignment with Minimum Wage Consideration (OOAMWC)
While the application of crowdsourcing has increased over the years, the technology experiences various issues during implementation. Examples of some of the issues that affect crowdsourcing include task assignment, profit maximizations, as well as time window issues. In some instances addressing some of the issues results in the other issues being overlooked. An example is when assigning tasks to workers, the profits of the workers might not be considered and this ends up affecting the profit maximization aspect. Various algorithms have been proposed to address the task assignment, profit maximizations, and time window issues. However, these algorithms address the issues individually and this results in the occurrence of the other noted issues. Therefore, this calls for the definition of a solution to address the task assignment issue while taking into consideration the time window issue and the minimum wage constraint. Additionally, the solution should address the profit maximization of not only the workers but also the platform and the clients of the platform. To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed solution, a comparison with the different implemented solutions to address individual issues is recommended. Comparing such solutions can provide insight into the efficiency of the proposed approach when addressing multiple issues affecting crowdsourcing
Incentive Mechanism Design in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems
In the past few years, the popularity of Mobile Crowdsensing Systems (MCSs) has been greatly prompted, in which sensory data can be ubiquitously collected and shared by mobile devices in a distributed fashion. Typically, a MCS consists of a cloud platform, sensing tasks, and mobile users equipped with mobile devices, in which the mobile users carry out sensing tasks and receive monetary rewards as compensation for resource consumption ( e.g., energy, bandwidth, and computation) and risk of privacy leakage ( e.g., location exposure). Compared with traditional mote-class sensor networks, MCSs can reduce the cost of deploying specialized sensing infrastructures and enable many applications that require resources and sensing modalities beyond the current mote-class sensor processes as today’s mobile devices (smartphones (iPhones, Sumsung Galaxy), tablets (iPad) and vehicle-embedded sensing devices (GPS)) integrate more computing, communication, and storage resources than traditional mote-class sensors. The current applications of MCSs include traffic congestion detection, wireless indoor localization, pollution monitoring, etc . There is no doubt that one of the most significant characteristics of MCSs is the active involvement of mobile users to collect and share sensory data.
In this dissertation, we study the incentive mechanism design in mobile crowdsensing system with consideration of economic properties.
Firstly, we investigate the problem of joining sensing task assignment and scheduling in MCSs with the following three considerations: i) partial fulfillment, ii) attribute diversity, and iii) price diversity. Then, we design a distributed auction framework to allow each task owner to independently process its local auction without collecting global information in a MCS, reducing communication cost. Next, we propose a cost-preferred auction scheme (CPAS) to assign each winning mobile user one or more sub- working time durations and a time schedule-preferred auction scheme (TPAS) to allocate each winning mobile user a continuous working time duration.
Secondly, we focus on the design of an incentive mechanism for an MCS to minimize the social cost. The social cost represents the total cost of mobile devices when all tasks published by the MCS are finished. We first present the working process of a MCS, and then build an auction market for the MCS where the MCS platform acts as an auctioneer and users with mobile devices act as bidders. Depending on the different requirements of the MCS platform, we design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism for the continuous working pattern and a suboptimal auction mechanism for the discontinuous working pattern. Both of them can ensure that the bidding of users are processed in a truthful way and the utilities of users are maximized. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulations, we can prove that these incentive mechanisms satisfy economic properties and can be implemented in reasonable time complexcity.
Next, we discuss the importance of fairness and unconsciousness of MCS surveillance applications. Then, we propose offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling based on the proportional share allocation rules. Furthermore, to have more sensing tasks done over time dimension, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness property requirements and design a (ε, μ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. Real map data are used to validate these proposed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations.
Finally, future research topics are proposed to complete the dissertation
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