A Game-Theoretic View of the Interference Channel: Impact of Coordination and Bargaining

This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In the scenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its actions only when an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. The users are first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type scheme with fixed power split. Conditions for which users have incentives to cooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches are used to solve the associated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is used as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point is obtained as a result of an optimization problem. Next, a dynamic alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining theory is introduced to model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation are characterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome of the AOBG is studied and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome are discussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-noise ratio regimes, the bargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.Comment: 43 pages, 11 figures, to appear on Special Issue of the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory on Interference Networks, 201

Deterministic Symmetry Breaking in Ring Networks

We study a distributed coordination mechanism for uniform agents located on a circle. The agents perform their actions in synchronised rounds. At the beginning of each round an agent chooses the direction of its movement from clockwise, anticlockwise, or idle, and moves at unit speed during this round. Agents are not allowed to overpass, i.e., when an agent collides with another it instantly starts moving with the same speed in the opposite direction (without exchanging any information with the other agent). However, at the end of each round each agent has access to limited information regarding its trajectory of movement during this round. We assume that $n$ mobile agents are initially located on a circle unit circumference at arbitrary but distinct positions unknown to other agents. The agents are equipped with unique identifiers from a fixed range. The {\em location discovery} task to be performed by each agent is to determine the initial position of every other agent. Our main result states that, if the only available information about movement in a round is limited to %information about distance between the initial and the final position, then there is a superlinear lower bound on time needed to solve the location discovery problem. Interestingly, this result corresponds to a combinatorial symmetry breaking problem, which might be of independent interest. If, on the other hand, an agent has access to the distance to its first collision with another agent in a round, we design an asymptotically efficient and close to optimal solution for the location discovery problem.Comment: Conference version accepted to ICDCS 201

Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games over the Gaussian Interference Channel

This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users to cooperate using a simple version of Han-Kobayashi scheme was studied and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was used to obtain a fair operating point. Here a noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers is adopted to model the bargaining process and rates resulting from the equilibrium outcome are analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the operating point resulting from the formulated bargaining game depends on the cost of delay in bargaining and how bargaining proceeds. If the associated bargaining problem is regular, a unique perfect equilibrium exists and lies on the individual rational efficient frontier of the achievable rate region. Besides, the equilibrium outcome approaches the NBS if the bargaining costs of both users are negligible.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, to appear in Proceedings of Forty-Eighth Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computin

Peer-to-Peer Secure Multi-Party Numerical Computation Facing Malicious Adversaries

We propose an efficient framework for enabling secure multi-party numerical computations in a Peer-to-Peer network. This problem arises in a range of applications such as collaborative filtering, distributed computation of trust and reputation, monitoring and other tasks, where the computing nodes is expected to preserve the privacy of their inputs while performing a joint computation of a certain function. Although there is a rich literature in the field of distributed systems security concerning secure multi-party computation, in practice it is hard to deploy those methods in very large scale Peer-to-Peer networks. In this work, we try to bridge the gap between theoretical algorithms in the security domain, and a practical Peer-to-Peer deployment. We consider two security models. The first is the semi-honest model where peers correctly follow the protocol, but try to reveal private information. We provide three possible schemes for secure multi-party numerical computation for this model and identify a single light-weight scheme which outperforms the others. Using extensive simulation results over real Internet topologies, we demonstrate that our scheme is scalable to very large networks, with up to millions of nodes. The second model we consider is the malicious peers model, where peers can behave arbitrarily, deliberately trying to affect the results of the computation as well as compromising the privacy of other peers. For this model we provide a fourth scheme to defend the execution of the computation against the malicious peers. The proposed scheme has a higher complexity relative to the semi-honest model. Overall, we provide the Peer-to-Peer network designer a set of tools to choose from, based on the desired level of security.Comment: Submitted to Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal (PPNA) 200

Complexity of Multi-Value Byzantine Agreement

In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the throughput of Byzantine agreement, given that the sum capacity of all links in between nodes in the system is finite. We have proposed a highly efficient Byzantine agreement algorithm on values of length l>1 bits. This algorithm uses error detecting network codes to ensure that fault-free nodes will never disagree, and routing scheme that is adaptive to the result of error detection. Our algorithm has a bit complexity of n(n-1)l/(n-t), which leads to a linear cost (O(n)) per bit agreed upon, and overcomes the quadratic lower bound (Omega(n^2)) in the literature. Such linear per bit complexity has only been achieved in the literature by allowing a positive probability of error. Our algorithm achieves the linear per bit complexity while guaranteeing agreement is achieved correctly even in the worst case. We also conjecture that our algorithm can be used to achieve agreement throughput arbitrarily close to the agreement capacity of a network, when the sum capacity is given

On the Simulatability Condition in Key Generation Over a Non-authenticated Public Channel

Simulatability condition is a fundamental concept in studying key generation over a non-authenticated public channel, in which Eve is active and can intercept, modify and falsify messages exchanged over the non-authenticated public channel. Using this condition, Maurer and Wolf showed a remarkable "all or nothing" result: if the simulatability condition does not hold, the key capacity over the non-authenticated public channel will be the same as that of the case with a passive Eve, while the key capacity over the non-authenticated channel will be zero if the simulatability condition holds. However, two questions remain open so far: 1) For a given joint probability mass function (PMF), are there efficient algorithms (polynomial complexity algorithms) for checking whether the simulatability condition holds or not?; and 2) If the simulatability condition holds, are there efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding attack strategy? In this paper, we answer these two open questions affirmatively. In particular, for a given joint PMF, we construct a linear programming (LP) problem and show that the simulatability condition holds \textit{if and only if} the optimal value obtained from the constructed LP is zero. Furthermore, we construct another LP and show that the minimizer of the newly constructed LP is a valid attack strategy. Both LPs can be solved with a polynomial complexity

Submodular relaxation for inference in Markov random fields

In this paper we address the problem of finding the most probable state of a discrete Markov random field (MRF), also known as the MRF energy minimization problem. The task is known to be NP-hard in general and its practical importance motivates numerous approximate algorithms. We propose a submodular relaxation approach (SMR) based on a Lagrangian relaxation of the initial problem. Unlike the dual decomposition approach of Komodakis et al., 2011 SMR does not decompose the graph structure of the initial problem but constructs a submodular energy that is minimized within the Lagrangian relaxation. Our approach is applicable to both pairwise and high-order MRFs and allows to take into account global potentials of certain types. We study theoretical properties of the proposed approach and evaluate it experimentally.Comment: This paper is accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligenc