Sparse Covers for Sums of Indicators

For all $n, \epsilon >0$, we show that the set of Poisson Binomial distributions on $n$ variables admits a proper $\epsilon$-cover in total variation distance of size $n^2+n \cdot (1/\epsilon)^{O(\log^2 (1/\epsilon))}$, which can also be computed in polynomial time. We discuss the implications of our construction for approximation algorithms and the computation of approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games.Comment: PTRF, to appea

Discretized Multinomial Distributions and Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou 2007. The approximation guarantee follows from a probabilistic result of more general interest: The distribution of the sum of n independent unit vectors with values ranging over {e1, e2, ...,ek}, where ei is the unit vector along dimension i of the k-dimensional Euclidean space, can be approximated by the distribution of the sum of another set of independent unit vectors whose probabilities of obtaining each value are multiples of 1/z for some integer z, and so that the variational distance of the two distributions is at most eps, where eps is bounded by an inverse polynomial in z and a function of k, but with no dependence on n. Our probabilistic result specifies the construction of a surprisingly sparse eps-cover -- under the total variation distance -- of the set of distributions of sums of independent unit vectors, which is of interest on its own right.Comment: In the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 200

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the number of players.Comment: full versio

Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query complexity}, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium. We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms. We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not have any exact Nash equilibrium in rational numbers. However, more positive query-complexity bounds are attainable if either further symmetries of the utility functions are assumed or we focus on approximate equilibria. We investigate four sub-classes of anonymous games previously considered by \cite{bfh09, dp14}. Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a $O(n^{-1/4})$-approximate Nash equilibrium querying $\tilde{O}(n^{3/2})$ payoffs and runs in time $\tilde{O}(n^{3/2})$. This improves on the running time of pre-existing algorithms for approximate equilibria of anonymous games, and is the first one to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in poly-time. We also show how this can be utilized as an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Furthermore, we prove that $\Omega(n \log{n})$ payoffs must be queried in order to find any $\epsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium, even by randomized algorithms

Learning Poisson Binomial Distributions

We consider a basic problem in unsupervised learning: learning an unknown \emph{Poisson Binomial Distribution}. A Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD) over $\{0,1,\dots,n\}$ is the distribution of a sum of $n$ independent Bernoulli random variables which may have arbitrary, potentially non-equal, expectations. These distributions were first studied by S. Poisson in 1837 \cite{Poisson:37} and are a natural $n$-parameter generalization of the familiar Binomial Distribution. Surprisingly, prior to our work this basic learning problem was poorly understood, and known results for it were far from optimal. We essentially settle the complexity of the learning problem for this basic class of distributions. As our first main result we give a highly efficient algorithm which learns to \eps-accuracy (with respect to the total variation distance) using \tilde{O}(1/\eps^3) samples \emph{independent of $n$}. The running time of the algorithm is \emph{quasilinear} in the size of its input data, i.e., \tilde{O}(\log(n)/\eps^3) bit-operations. (Observe that each draw from the distribution is a $\log(n)$-bit string.) Our second main result is a {\em proper} learning algorithm that learns to \eps-accuracy using \tilde{O}(1/\eps^2) samples, and runs in time (1/\eps)^{\poly (\log (1/\eps))} \cdot \log n. This is nearly optimal, since any algorithm {for this problem} must use \Omega(1/\eps^2) samples. We also give positive and negative results for some extensions of this learning problem to weighted sums of independent Bernoulli random variables.Comment: Revised full version. Improved sample complexity bound of O~(1/eps^2

An Empirical Study on Computation of Exact and Approximate Equilibria

The computation of Nash equilibria is one of the central topics in game theory, which has received much attention from a theoretical point of view. Studies have shown that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, which implies that we are unlikely to find a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. Naturally, this has led to a line of work studying the complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria. This thesis examines the computation of such approximate Nash equilibria within several classes of games from an empirical perspective. In this thesis, we address the computation of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix and polymatrix games. For both of these game classes, we provide a library of implementations of algorithms for the computation of exact and approximate Nash equilibria, as well as a suite of game generators which were used as a base for our empirical analysis of the algorithms. We investigate the trade-off between quality of approximation produced by the algorithms and the expected runtime. We provide some insight into the inner workings of the state-of-the-art algorithm for computing ε-Nash equilibria, presenting worst-case examples found for our provided suite of game generators. We then show lower bounds on these algorithms. In the case of polymatrix games, we generate this lower bound from a real-world application of game theory. For bimatrix games, we provide a robust means of generating lower bounds for approximation algorithms with the use of genetic algorithms