Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism, A Global Perspective

While Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, would strike most Americans as the starting date for terrorism- at least as understood by a recently attacked America- the truth is very different both from the American and international perspective. The scope and intensity of the attack that Tuesday morning dramatically changed the American response to terrorism in the short-term and long-term. The change in America\u27s response has impacted the American political debate, its way of life, and its legal and policy perspectives regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism alike. September 11 also had a global impact from an operational, intelligence-gathering, policy and legal perspective. The world has known terrorism for years, or at least parts of it have, and different nations have responded in varying ways to attack. How nations respond is often a reflection of their existing infrastructure, operational abilities, political system, and culture. However, as this article discusses, the different responses clearly exhibit a common theme, that of responding while attempting to strike a balance between legitimate national security interests and the rights of the individual. That balance, from the perspective of both law and policy, will be analyzed in the context of terrorist threats and actual attacks alike. The analysis of the legal and policy responses is the core of this article

Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain

The terrorist attacks of 9/11, and subsequent terrorist acts around the world, have alerted social psychologists to the need to examine the antecedents and consequences of terrorist threat perception. In these two studies we examined the predictive power of demographic factors (age, sex, location), individual values and normative influences on threat perception and the consequences of this perception for behavioural change and close relationships. In study 1 (N = 100) gender, benevolence values and normative influences were all correlates of threat perception, whilst sense of personal threat was correlated with increased contact with friends and family. In study 2 (N = 240) age, sex, location, and the values of Openness to Change and Hedonism, all predicted threat perception, which in turn predicted behavioural change and relationship contact. Such findings point to the important role social psychologists should play in understanding responses to these new terrorist threats

Arguments for exception in US security discourse

In his influential State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben proposes that, even in apparently liberal western democracies, the state will routinely use the contingency of national emergency to suspend civil liberties and justify expansion of military and police powers. We investigated rhetorical strategies deployed in the web pages of US security agencies, created or reformed in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, to determine whether they present argumentation conforming to Agamben’s model. To expose rhetorical content, we examined strategies operating at two levels within our corpus. Argument schemes and underlying warrants were identified through close examination of systematically selected core documents. Semantic fields establishing themes of threat and danger were also explored, using automatic corpus tools to expose patterns of lexical selection established across the whole corpus. The study recovered evidence of rhetoric broadly consistent with the logic predicted by State of Exception theory, but also presented nuanced findings whose interpretation required careful re-appraisal of core ideas within Agamben’s work

Federalism as an effective antidote to terrorism

Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and police forces as the only way to effectively counter terrorism. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be military strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against individuals known or suspected of being terrorists, or against persons supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military and paramilitary action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist groups, as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. This paper argues that decentralization constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for terrorists to attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller than in a centralized society. It moreover strengthens society, as economic, political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an essential element of a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society that actively guards its fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized decision-making forms an essential part

Cybersecurity: mapping the ethical terrain

This edited collection examines the ethical trade-offs involved in cybersecurity: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and between the types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. Foreword Governments and society are increasingly reliant on cyber systems. Yet the more reliant we are upon cyber systems, the more vulnerable we are to serious harm should these systems be attacked or used in an attack. This problem of reliance and vulnerability is driving a concern with securing cyberspace. For example, a ‘cybersecurity’ team now forms part of the US Secret Service. Its job is to respond to cyber-attacks in specific environments such as elevators in a building that hosts politically vulnerable individuals, for example, state representatives. Cybersecurity aims to protect cyberinfrastructure from cyber-attacks; the concerning aspect of the threat from cyber-attack is the potential for serious harm that damage to cyber-infrastructure presents to resources and people. These types of threats to cybersecurity might simply target information and communication systems: a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a government website does not harm a website in any direct way, but prevents its normal use by stifling the ability of users to connect to the site. Alternatively, cyber-attacks might disrupt physical devices or resources, such as the Stuxnet virus, which caused the malfunction and destruction of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Cyber-attacks might also enhance activities that are enabled through cyberspace, such as the use of online media by extremists to recruit members and promote radicalisation. Cyber-attacks are diverse: as a result, cybersecurity requires a comparable diversity of approaches. Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on people’s lives, and so—in liberal democratic societies at least—governments have a duty to ensure cybersecurity in order to protect the inhabitants within their own jurisdiction and, arguably, the people of other nations. But, as recent events following the revelations of Edward Snowden have demonstrated, there is a risk that the governmental pursuit of cybersecurity might overstep the mark and subvert fundamental privacy rights. Popular comment on these episodes advocates transparency of government processes, yet given that cybersecurity risks represent major challenges to national security, it is unlikely that simple transparency will suffice. Managing the risks of cybersecurity involves trade-offs: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. These trade-offs are often ethical trade-offs, involving questions of how we act, what values we should aim to promote, and what means of anticipating and responding to the risks are reasonably—and publicly—justifiable. This Occasional Paper (prepared for the National Security College) provides a brief conceptual analysis of cybersecurity, demonstrates the relevance of ethics to cybersecurity and outlines various ways in which to approach ethical decision-making when responding to cyber-attacks

Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] This report focuses on international and domestic human trafficking and U.S. policy responses, with particular emphasis on the TVPA and its subsequent reauthorizations. The report begins with a description of key TIP-related definitions and an overview of the human trafficking problem. It follows with an overview of major foreign policy responses to international human trafficking. The report then focuses on responses to trafficking into and within the United States, examining relief for trafficking victims in the United States and discussing U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat domestic trafficking. The report concludes with an overview of current anti-trafficking legislation and an analysis of policy issues

No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint

This essay reviews Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts, which I consider the most serious, sustained, and thoughtful effort to defend the Bush administration’s aggressive tactics in the war on terror yet written. That the book is ultimately deeply flawed only underscores the failure of the Bush administration’s approach. Where most historians view with regret the excesses of past security crises, from the criminalization of speech during World War I to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Posner and Vermeule advance the contrarian view that the system worked exactly as it should have, because in each instance, executive officials took aggressive action in response to perceived security threats, and courts and Congress deferred to or approved of the executive’s initiatives. In Posner and Vermeule’s view, there is no reason to believe that government officials will overreact during times of crisis, and no basis for judging what executive officials have done, because they have the expertise and access to information that the rest of us lack. I argue that Posner and Vermeule’s argument for deference to the executive is misguided for three reasons. First, their assumption that there is a necessary and “straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security” is far too simplistic. Executives often sacrifice liberty without achieving an increase in security. Security may be advanced in a variety of ways without infringing on liberty. There is no reason to assume that sacrificing liberty is necessary to further security or that such sacrifices are warranted simply because the executive chooses to make them. Second, Posner and Vermeule’s account of the political dynamics of emergency periods fails to take into account significant factors that predictably contribute to overreaching by the executive, infringement of human rights, selective targeting of disempowered minority groups, and institutionalization of authorities that last well beyond the emergency itself. Once these factors are properly considered, there are strong reasons not to defer to executive power, especially in emergencies. Third, the authors’ argument that the executive is best situated to balance liberty and security in emergencies fails to consider the full range of qualities that one might want in an agency tasked to strike such a balance. Precisely because we rely so heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be skeptical of its ability to give sufficient weight to the liberty side of the balance. Judicial review plays an essential role in achieving an appropriate balance; deference to the executive undermines that role

Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime

According to Justice William J. Brennan, After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along. This Article examines that observation, using Korematsu as a vehicle for refining the claim and, I think, reducing it to a more defensible one. Part I opens my discussion, providing some qualifications to the broad claim about threats to civil liberties in wartime. Part II then deals with Korematsu and other historical examples of civil liberties in wartime. It identifies a pattern in those examples and provides a sketch of a social theory that might account for the pattern. Part III describes, in relatively optimistic terms, a process of social learning in which past examples of what come to be understood as incursions on civil liberties progressively reduce the scope of civil liberties violations in wartime. Part IV raises jurisprudential questions about the role of emergency powers in liberal constitutions. In the end, I defend Korematsu in the perhaps ironic sense that Korematsu was part of a process of social learning that both diminishes contemporary threats to civil liberties in our present situation and reproduces a framework of constitutionalism that ensures that such threats will be a permanent part of the constitutional landscape

A Survey of the Economics of Security

This report assesses the literature on the inter-relations between the economy and security with particular focus on terrorism and the "human drivers of insecurity" to identify both available knowledge and crucial research gaps. In addition, the report surveys the European research capacity in the field of security economics. The study is based on a thorough literature survey of the newly emerging field of security economics, using a variety of electronic catalogues and search engines as sources. The study reveals that it is not just terror attacks but also security measures of private and public agents responding to the threat of terrorism that incur significant repercussions for the economy, often with trans-national consequences. Impacts vary with the maturity of an economy; appropriate ex ante and ex post policies are critical to contain the damage of terrorism. Given the dynamic nature of human-induced insecurity, policies should place emphasis on "systemic resilience". Gaps in the economic security literature include insufficient knowledge of the behaviour of terrorists and their targets. Furthermore, the global impacts of terror attacks and especially of security measures require more analysis. Future research requires a more rigorous conceptual framework, methodological improvements and, above all, better data. In comparison to the United States, the current research capacity in security economics in Europe is weak. On the one hand, there is significant research potential in the field of security economics within the European Union in the shape of several high quality researchers. On the other hand, the existing research infrastructure and institutional barriers both inhibit this potential from being developed academically and for policy advice. Establishing a European network of security economists and funding a European centre for security economics could contribute to remedy this situation.